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THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE AFTER
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
V. THURAISSIGIAM
JONATHAN HAFETZ†
INTRODUCTION
In June 2020, in Department of Homeland Security v.
Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected a
constitutional challenge to Congress’s decision to eliminate habeas
corpus jurisdiction over legal challenges to expedited removal
orders by noncitizens in federal detention.1
In Thuraissigiam, U.S. border patrol stopped the petitioner,
Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam, a Sri Lankan national of Tamil
ethnicity, shortly after he crossed the U.S.-Mexico border without
inspection or an entry document.2 The petitioner asserted that he
was fleeing persecution in his home country and sought asylum in
the United States.
The asylum officer concluded that
Thuraissigiam had not established a “credible fear of persecution,”
as defined by statute, and therefore was ineligible for asylum.3
The immigration judge agreed, which meant that Thuraissigiam
was ordered removed.4 Thuraissigiam sought federal habeas
review, arguing that the procedures that led to his removal order
were deficient and that the immigration agents had failed to
properly apply U.S. asylum law to his claim. The government,
however, maintained that Congress had eliminated habeas review
of claims by individuals subjected to expedited removal
procedures, with limited exceptions that Thuraissigiam did not
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Id. at 1967.
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Id. at 1968.
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claim before the Supreme Court applied to his case.5
Thuraissigiam argued that these restrictions violated the
Suspension Clause.
The district court dismissed the petition,6 but the Ninth
Circuit reversed, finding that the elimination of habeas review for
those facing expedited removal violated the Suspension Clause.7
In reaching its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the
Third Circuit which had previously upheld Congress’s elimination
of habeas review of expedited removal against a Suspension
Clause challenge.8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari9 and reversed.10 The
five-Justice majority opinion, authored by Justice Alito, held that
the Suspension Clause did not apply because Thuraissigiam’s
challenge—which the Court characterized as asserting a right to
remain in the United States or, alternatively, to obtain additional
administrative process to attain that result, rather than seeking
simple release from custody—did not fall within historical core of
habeas corpus protected by the Suspension Clause.11 The Court
further concluded that its prior decisions, which had reviewed
legal challenges by noncitizens facing immigration removal in the
face of congressional restrictions on judicial review, reflected an
exercise of statutory construction rather than an interpretation of
the Suspension Clause.12 Thuraissigiam also distinguished the
Court’s most recent Suspension Clause ruling, Boumediene v.
Bush,13 determining that the petitioners there, alleged “enemy
combatants” held at Guantanamo Bay, did not seek to enter the

5

In the courts below, Thuraissigiam argued that the expedited removal statute
should be construed to provide for review of his claims to avoid a constitutional
problem, but did not press that argument before the Supreme Court. See
Thuraissigiam v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Thuraissigiam II), 917 F.3d 1097, 1103−04
(9th Cir. 2019) (considering and rejecting the argument that the statute provides for
such review).
6
Thuraissigiam v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Thuraissigiam I), 287 F. Supp. 3d
1077, 1078 (S.D. Ca. 2018).
7
Thuraissigiam II, 917 F.3d at 1113–19.
8
Castro v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 425 (3d Cir. 2016).
9
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam (Thuraissigiam III), 140 S. Ct. 427,
427 (2019).
10
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1983 (2020).
11
Id. at 1969–70. Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion but also concurred
to express his view that the Suspension Clause was limited to its original purpose of
preventing the executive from detaining individuals without bail or trial based on
suspicion of a crime or dangerousness. Id. at 1983 (Thomas, J., concurring).
12
Id. at 1980−81.
13
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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United States, but instead only sought release from U.S. military
custody.14
Justice Alito then reached out to decide whether the Due
Process Clause independently entitled Thuraissigiam to judicial
review,15 even though Thuraissigiam had only raised a due process
claim on the merits based on flaws in the administrative “credible
fear” process,16 and had maintained that the Court first needed to
find habeas jurisdiction under the Suspension Clause before
reaching any due process issue.17 The Court nevertheless ruled
that Thuraissigiam had no due process right to any additional
protections in challenging his expedited removal beyond what
Congress had provided because he was seized just inside the
border after entering the country without inspection.18 The Court
reached this conclusion despite its prior precedents stating that
the Due Process Clause protected all persons inside the country
regardless of whether they had entered without inspection or how
far inside the border they had been seized.19
Justice Thomas wrote separately to express his view that the
Suspension Clause, based on what he described as its original
meaning, should be limited to “the circumstances in which
Congress may give the executive power to detain without bail or

14

Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1981; see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723 at 732.
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1981–82.
16
See Thuraissigiam II, 917 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2019); Brief for Respondent
at 5–6, Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020) (No. 19-161).
17
See Gerald Neuman, The Supreme Court’s Attack on Habeas Corpus in DHS v.
Thuraissigiam, JUST SEC. (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/72104/thesupreme-courts-attack-on-habeas-corpus-in-dhs-v-thuraissigiam
[https://perma.cc/ZBD7-HHLP] (“Thuraissigiam had discussed the applicability of
procedural due process to the administrative procedure for expedited removal from
the interior, but he had never claimed that the Due Process Clause gave him a right
to judicial review. Neither did the Ninth Circuit hold that the preclusion of review
violated due process, and Alito’s statement that it did so is an easily fact-checked
falsehood.”).
18
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1982–83 (“Like an alien detained after arriving
at a port of entry, an alien like [Thuraissigam] is ‘on the threshold’ [of entry],” and
thus has no due process right to challenge his removal.) (quoting Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)); see also United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the procedure authorized
by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”).
19
See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“The distinction between
an alien who has effected an entry into the United States and one who has never
entered runs throughout immigration law. . . . [O]nce an alien enters the country, the
legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within
the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent.”).
15
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trial based on suspicion of a crime or dangerousness.”20 Since
expedited removal does not permit detention on this basis, but
instead allows for a noncitizen’s removal based on a lack of proper
documentation and ineligibility for asylum, it cannot constitute a
suspension of the writ.21
In another concurring opinion, Justice Breyer, joined by
Justice Ginsburg, critiqued the Court’s decision for its
unnecessary sweep.22 The concurrence would have instead denied
Thuraissigiam’s challenge for two reasons: first, because the scope
of any constitutionally mandated habeas review in these
circumstances—where a border patrol agent apprehends a
noncitizen without prior connections to the United States just 25
yards inside the border—must be narrow;23 and second, because
Thuraissigiam’s claims, which Justice Breyer said primarily
sought review of agency fact-finding, were the type of claims that
Congress can make unreviewable in habeas proceedings
consistent with the Suspension Clause.24
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kagan, issued a lengthy
and forceful dissent.25
Justice Sotomayor maintained that
immigration removal decisions are covered by the Suspension
Clause and accused the majority of distorting both history and
precedent.26 Justice Sotomayor explained that Thuraissigiam’s
request—to be released from wrongful executive custody—fell
within the historical core of the writ and was “indistinguishable”
from prior instances of noncitizens challenging restraints that
prevented them from seeking shelter in the country.27 Justice
Sotomayor criticized the majority’s use of history, observing that
the Court had “never rigidly demanded a one-to-one match
between a habeas proceeding and a common-law habeas analog”—
a particularly problematic methodological approach, she insisted,
given that immigration law, as such, did not exist at common
law.28 She also said the majority’s decision could not be squared
with Supreme Court precedent that had consistently recognized
that the Suspension Clause mandated at least some judicial
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1988 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 1989 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 1990.
Id. at 1990−91.
Id. at 1993 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1998.
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intervention in immigration removal decisions.29
Justice
Sotomayor further explained that Justice Breyer’s concurrence
misconstrued Thuraissigiam’s claims, which did not seek to
overturn a purely factual error, but rather challenged the agency’s
misapplication of the legal standard to the existing facts, a type of
claim that had traditionally been reviewable through habeas.30
She argued that the petitioner also should be able to challenge
constitutional defects in the procedures themselves through
habeas.31
This Article explains why the Supreme Court made multiple,
critical errors in Thuraissigiam. The Court not only misread the
historical record, but also misunderstood how history should
inform construction of the Suspension Clause. In particular, the
Court drew misguided inferences from the writ’s past use and
ignored the judiciary’s long-established power to remedy a broad
range of illegal restraints on liberty through habeas. These errors
were compounded by the Court’s reading of both its precedents
from the “finality era,” a sixty-year-period during which Congress
sought to make administrative immigration removal
determinations final, and the Court’s more recent decisions in INS
v. St. Cyr,32 Boumediene v. Bush,33 and Munaf v. Geren.34
As several commentators have observed, Thuraissigiam, if
read broadly, has potentially far-reaching implications.35 By
suggesting that the application of the Suspension Clause turns on
the nature and purpose of the physical restraint—that is,
continued detention as opposed to forcible transfer—

29

Id. at 2004−10.
Id. at 1994−95.
31
Id. at 1995−96.
32
533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001); see also Lee Kovarsky, Habeas Privilege Origination
and DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 121 COLUM. L. REV. F. 23, 38 (2021).
33
553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008).
34
553 U.S. 674, 705 (2008).
35
For some initial assessments of Thuraissigiam’s potential implications, see, e.g.,
Leading Case, Article I−Suspension Clause−Expedited Removal Challenges−Department
of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 13 HARV. L. REV. 410, 410 (2020) [hereinafter
“Article I−Suspension Clause−Expedited Removal Challenges”]; Ahilan Arulanantham &
Adam Cox, Immigration Maximalism at the Supreme Court, JUST SEC. (Aug. 11, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/71939/immigration-maximalism-at-the-supreme-court/
[https://perma.cc/TT39-7E6R]; Neuman, supra note 17; Kovarsky, supra note 32, at 40−41;
Joshua J. Schroeder, Conservative Progressivism in Immigrant Habeas Court, Why
Boumediene v. Bush is the Baseline Constitutional Minimum, 45 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE: THE HARBINGER 46, 65 (2021); Amanda L. Tyler, Thuraissigiam and the Future
of the Suspension Clause, LAWFARE (July 2, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com
/thuraissigiam-and-future-suspension-clause [https://perma.cc/8PXU-6WQL].
30
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Thuraissigiam could lead to further restrictions on judicial review
not only over immigration law enforcement but also over other
executive actions, disposing of a person’s liberty through their
physical transfer across borders, covering everything from
extradition to the hand-over of military prisoners.36 Additionally,
Thuraissigiam raises questions about habeas’s role in the
separation of powers. The Suspension Clause strictly confines the
ability of the political branches to eliminate judicial review over
detention, protecting both individual liberty and structural
interests. Eliminating such review requires express action by
Congress in the form of a valid suspension of the writ, which is a
high bar given that the Constitution requires a threat to the public
safety in the form of an invasion or rebellion.37 While the Trump
administration suggested that an influx of migrants coming across
the southern border posed such an emergency, Congress did not
suspend habeas corpus, nor did the government argue that the
conditions for such a suspension could have been met.38 Instead,
the decision excluded a category of executive action—the
procedures used to remove certain asylum seekers—from
constitutionally guaranteed judicial intervention.39
More
ominously, the Court, in a footnote, appeared to revive the
suggestion that the Constitution might not secure any habeas
review at all,40 even as the Court expressly declined to revisit its
prior insistence that the Constitution guarantees, at minimum,
the habeas writ that existed in 1789.41

36
While not the focus of this Article, Thuraissigiam also seems to imply that
certain rights under the Due Process Clause that were previously understood to apply
to noncitizens immediately upon physical entry into the United States may now no
longer apply unless further ties to the United States are established, and thus
Thuraissigiam’s implications in that regard are potentially far-reaching as well.
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1961 (2020).
37
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
38
See Jordan Fabian, Trump: Migrant Caravan ‘is an Invasion’, THE HILL (Oct.
29, 2018), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/413624-trump-calls-migrantcaravan-an-invasion [https://perma.cc/XZ5R-C6MT].
39
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1970–71 (2020).
40
Id. at 1969 n.12; Id. at 1997 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The Court wisely
declines to explore whether the Suspension Clause independently guarantees the
availability of the writ or simply restricts the temporary withholding of its
operation . . . .”).
41
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746 (2008) (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
289, 301 (2001)); see also Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1997 n.1 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (noting that “no majority of this Court, at any time, has adopted th[e]
theory” that the Suspension Clause does not independently guarantee the writ but
protects only against its unlawful suspension once made available by Congress).
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The Article argues against reading Thuraissigiam broadly
and offers several ways to preserve meaningful judicial review of
a variety of physical restraints.
Notably, in rejecting
Thuraissigiam’s Suspension Clause challenge, the Supreme Court
addressed only the argument that the petitioner was entitled to
habeas based on the writ that existed in 1789. Because the Court
concluded that Thuraissigiam had waived any argument that the
Suspension Clause’s reach had broadened over time, it declined to
address that argument. Thus, despite Thuraissigiam’s significant
errors—all of which reinforce the need to interpret the decision
narrowly—Thuraissigiam presents an opportunity to examine
why the Suspension Clause should be interpreted to protect more
than the habeas writ that existed in 1789. The Article argues that
adopting a more flexible conception of the Suspension Clause—one
capable of evolving over time to encompass immigration removal
and other restraints on liberty that did not necessarily exist at the
nation’s founding—would be more faithful to the writ’s historical
understandings and purpose, more closely aligned with how the
Court interprets other constitutional provisions protecting
individual liberty, and more difficult for the government to
circumvent based on how it characterizes the nature and purpose
of the restraint. The Article is thus animated by Thuraissigiam’s
errant—and dangerous—attempt to parse the Suspension Clause
based on a typology of the custodial restraint, differentiating
between forms of detention based on whether the ultimate goal is
continued imprisonment or some other end, such as involuntary
removal from the country.
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides a brief
overview of the expedited removal scheme challenged in
Thuraissigiam. Part II analyzes several critical flaws in the
Court’s decision. Part III describes Thuraissigiam’s potential
implications for judicial review not only over immigration removal,
but also over other types of physical transfers, including the
transfer of prisoners within the United States, extradition, and
military cases. Part IV explains why the Suspension Clause
should be interpreted to guarantee not only the habeas writ that
existed in 1789, but also the writ as it has evolved over time.
Interpreting the Suspension Clause’s habeas guarantee as capable
of adapting and evolving is consistent with the writ’s history,
original understanding, and purpose. This approach would
provide an additional way to avoid potentially overbroad readings
of Thuraissigiam with respect to other immigration removal
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decisions, such as the deportation of permanent residents, as well
as other types of forcible transfers,such as extradition and military
transfers, to ensure that habeas corpus remains an effective
guarantee of judicial review in the realm of detentions.
I. EXPEDITED REMOVAL AND CONGRESS’S LIMITATIONS ON
HABEAS REVIEW
The expedited removal scheme at issue in Thuraissigiam has
its origins in 1996 legislation—the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”)42—that sought to
facilitate removal at ports of entry by limiting review of action by
immigration enforcement officials.43 Expedited removal covers
noncitizens who seek to enter the United States without valid
entry documents44 or who present false documentation. 45 Even
though IIRIRA authorized the use of expedited removal
throughout the country, the authority was initially applied only at
ports of entry.46 However, various policy and regulatory shifts
since the early 2000s expanded its reach under the power
authorized by the statute: first, to noncitizens arriving at ports of
entry; then, to “noncitizens arriving by sea (not necessarily
through formal ports of entry)”; next, to noncitizens seized within
100 miles of any international border, as long as they had entered
the United States within the last fourteen days; and finally, under
the Trump administration, nationwide to any noncitizen who
could not show they were continuously present in the country for
two years, the maximum period allowed by IIRIRA.47 Further, as
noted above, the two initial expansions applied only to noncitizens
determined to have been continuously present in the United
States for less than fourteen days, but the third expansion
extended that period to two years.
The use of expedited removal has grown over time as well,
especially since the Obama administration’s aggressive
42

Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 302, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 579−84 (1996) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1225).
43
Id. at 582.
44
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i).
45
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).
46
ALISON SISKIN & RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33109,
IMMIGRATION POLICY ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL OF ALIENS 2 (2009),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20090130_RL33109_0da5394ccb73e22db6286d4acd
1385b88c40c35a.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WK9-BV3G].
47
Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L.
REV. 181, 197 (2017) (discussing expansions).
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implementation of the procedures against migrants fleeing
violence in Central America starting in 2014.48 The Trump
administration’s most recent expansion of expedited removal
sought to subject more than 300,000 additional individuals to
expedited removal procedures,49 while effectively treating the
entire United States as a de facto border zone. Meanwhile, the
expedited removal process has come under increased criticism due
to the risk of error and abuse, such as when border agents fail to
properly identify asylum seekers.50
Expedited removal generally empowers immigration
enforcement agents to remove covered noncitizens from the United
States without further review.51 However, it creates an exception
for individuals who claim asylum, which triggers additional
procedures.52 If an individual indicates an intent to apply for
asylum or expresses a fear of returning to their home country, the
agent must refer the case for a “credible fear” screening by an
asylum officer,53 who must decide if there is “a significant
possibility” the individual could establish their eligibility for
asylum at a full hearing before an immigration judge—namely by
showing that they have been persecuted or have a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of a protected category.54 If the
agent finds a “credible fear,” the noncitizen receives an ordinary
removal hearing before an immigration judge55 with a right of
appeal to a federal court of appeals.56 If not, they receive only
truncated review of the credible fear determination by an
immigration judge before the removal order becomes final and

48
Id. (“Throughout much of the late 1990s and early 2000s, the agency’s
implementation of expedited removal was inconsistent, with certain sectors of the
country using it more readily than others.”).
49
Vanessa M. Garza, Comment, Unheard and Deported: The Unconstitutional
Denial of Habeas Corpus in Expedited Removal, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 881, 887 (2019).
50
Koh, supra note 47, at 199 (“Recent advocacy reports contain examples of border
officials failing to properly identify asylum seekers, either due to agency officials not
asking the requisite questions or due to the intimidating atmosphere associated with
interviews taking place at the border.”).
51
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
52
Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii).
53
Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (B)(ii).
54
Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v). An individual fleeing persecution can additionally seek
two other forms of relief: withholding of removal and deferral of removal under the
Convention Against Torture (the latter of which does not require demonstrating a
protected ground). See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16, 208.18 (2021).
55
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).
56
8 C.F.R. § 1003.39.
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executable.57 The statute restricts subsequent federal judicial
review of an expedited removal order to a habeas proceeding in
which the petitioner may challenge only whether they are a
noncitizen; are, in fact, the subject of an expedited removal order;
or are entitled to a fuller hearing based on their existing status as
a legal permanent resident or previously admitted refugee or
asylee.58 The habeas proceeding, in short, provides no review of
whether a person is properly subject to the government’s expedited
removal authority or whether this authority is being applied
unlawfully. It also provides no review of the credible fear
determination itself, including whether the agency properly
applied the proper legal standard or whether the procedure itself
violated the Constitution. Additionally, as long as the federal
government chooses to avail itself of the full extent of its removal
authority under the statute, even noncitizens who have been living
in the United States for up to two years and who assert they face
grave danger if returned to their home country, may be deported
with only minimal procedures and review.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S CRITICAL ERRORS IN THURAISSIGIAM
Thuraissigiam addressed whether there was jurisdiction over
the petitioner’s challenge to his expedited removal.59 The Supreme
Court’s analysis centered on three areas: (1) historical practice
from England and from the colonial and Founding eras in the
United States;60 (2) “finality era” cases, the period from 1891 to
1952, when Congress sought to make administrative immigration
decisions “final” but courts nonetheless continued to exercise some
habeas review over them; 61 and (3) the Court’s more recent
decisions in St. Cyr,62 Boumediene,63 and Munaf.64 In each area,
the Court distorted historical understandings of the writ and
misread its own precedents.

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III).
8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2)(A)-(C).
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1961 (2020).
Id. at 1971.
Id. at 1976.
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1981.
Id. at 1970–71.
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Historical Practice

The Supreme Court had previously stated that, “at the
absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the writ ‘as it
existed in 1789,’ ” when the Constitution was adopted.65 Congress
provided a statutory basis for federal habeas in the First Judiciary
Act of 1789, and has expanded the scope of the habeas statute over
time.66 In Thuraissigiam, the Court declined to address whether
the Suspension Clause protected any expansions to the 1789
habeas writ because it concluded that any such argument had
been waived,67 and thus restricted its inquiry to the 1789 writ. As
described below, the Thuraissigiam Court misconstrued not only
the 1789 writ, but also how the historical record should inform
interpretation of the Suspension Clause.
The Court framed its analysis to ask whether, at the time the
Constitution was adopted, the writ permitted a petitioner to claim
a right to enter or remain in the country or to obtain
administrative review leading to that result.68 While the Court
acknowledged that the historical record showed that habeas had
always been used to challenge a variety of physical restraints, it
maintained that in all of those cases the petitioner had sought
release as the remedy,69 and not some additional process to seek a
different remedy.
That is, the Court distinguished
Thuraissigiam’s request as one for further review of his asylum
claim in order to remain in the United States.70
The Court relied on this narrow and rigid framing to
distinguish one of the most important historical precedents, the
65

St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301 (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996)).
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81−82 (authorizing justices of the
Supreme Court, as well as district court judges, to grant writs of habeas corpus
“for the . . . inquiry into the cause of commitment”). For an overview of congressional
modifications to the federal habeas statute, see generally RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S.
LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (7th ed. 2015).
67
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1969, 1975 (“[Thuraissigiam] does not ask us to
hold that the Suspension Clause guarantees the writ as it might have evolved since
the adoption of the Constitution. On the contrary, as noted at the outset of this
discussion, he rests his argument on ‘the writ as it existed in 1789.’ ”) (quoting Brief
for Respondent at 26 n.12, Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020) (No. 19-161)).
68
Id. at 1969.
69
Id. at 1971−72 (noting cases involving confinement for contempt of court,
medical malpractice, failing to pay an assessment to the king or a tax to the colonial
authorities, and impressment into military service or involuntary servitude).
70
Id. at 1972. Thuraissigiam had, in fact, sought conditional release pending a
new asylum hearing which, if successful, would have granted him the right to remain
in the United States. Brief for Respondent at 29, Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. 1959
(2020) (No. 19-161).
66
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King Bench’s celebrated 1772 decision in Somerset v. Stewart.71 In
Somerset, Lord Mansfield ordered the release (into England) of the
petitioner, Somerset, held on a ship bound for Jamaica on the
ground that his detention as a slave was unlawful in England.72
Because England did not at the time have any law, like modern
immigration restrictions, that limited residency in the country, the
Thuraissigiam Court explained that the practical result of
Somerset—that the successful petitioner was permitted to remain
in England—was merely “a collateral consequence” and not the
object of the litigation.73 Thus, the Court concluded, Somerset did
not support the proposition that habeas would have been available
at the time to challenge an immigration removal order.74
The Court distinguished cases involving deserting foreign
sailors on similar grounds. While the sailors may have been able
to remain in the United States after obtaining their release
through habeas, the Court said, it was not a result of the habeas
action but rather because immigration law as such either did not
exist at the time or permitted them to remain in the country.75 The
Court also disregarded precedents from both England76 and the
American colonies77 that demonstrated habeas’s use to challenge
the unlawful removal or exclusion of prisoners from a territory.
The Court likewise rejected the analogy to extradition, where
71

See generally Somerset v. Stewart (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (KB).
Id. at 510.
73
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1973.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1973−74.
76
The Court disregarded Murray’s Case, where the Kings Bench had ordered the
release of a petitioner who sought to prevent his removal from England to Scotland,
where he faced criminal prosecution, because the case had not been published in an
official report and because of the particular nature of the relationship between
England and Scotland at the time. Id. at 1972 & n.18. But published cases from this
historical period are scattershot, and the relationship between England and Scotland
notwithstanding, Murray’s Case provides historical support for the writ’s use to review
deportations of a prisoner from the territory. For a discussion of Murray’s Case, see
PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 236 (2010).
77
The Court ignored altogether historical evidence from the American colonies
suggesting that habeas could be used to resist removal by a governmental authority.
See Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1999–2000 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing
the historical evidence). In 1755, for example, French settlers from British-controlled
Nova Scotia were detained in ships off the coast of Charleston, South Carolina, after
British authorities sought to deport them there and South Carolina resisted. James
Oldham & Michael J. Wishnie, The Historical Scope of Habeas Corpus and INS v. St.
Cyr., 16 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 485, 497−98 (2002). The Governor and Assembly of South
Carolina, however, ultimately allowed their resettlement in the colony because they
recognized that habeas corpus would have prevented their continued exclusion. See
id. at 498.
72
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judges have traditionally exercised habeas review. In addition to
“post-dat[ing] the founding era,”78 the Court said, petitioners in
extradition cases simply sought release from custody when not in
compliance with extradition statutes or treaties, rather than
asserting a right to remain in the country.79
The Court not only misread these precedents, but did so in a
way that transformed what should have been a nuanced historical
analysis of the background principles and understandings that
informed the common law writ into a demand for an exact
historical parallel to the asylum claim pressed by Thuraissigiam,
even though immigration law did not exist in 1789 in the United
States or previously in England.80
While the petitioner in Somerset technically did seek release
from custody, that relief was intertwined with his challenge to his
forceable transfer to Jamaica, and Lord Mansfield plainly believed
that the court’s habeas powers encompassed review of the legality
of a restraint aimed at the transfer or removal of a prisoner from
the territory.81 After all, if Lord Mansfield had no power to bar
Somerset’s transfer as unlawful because there was no authority
under English law to force a slave to leave the country against his
will, he could not have ordered his release. Justice Alito’s reading
of Somerset also assumes that, if England did have a statutory
immigration law regime at the time,82 Lord Mansfield would not
have barred Somerset’s unlawful transfer as a slave to Jamaica
because Somerset would have had to establish his right to remain
in England under that regime, for example, based on a statutory
provision granting migrants fleeing danger the right to seek
shelter under the duly enacted laws of England.83 But nothing
remotely suggests that Lord Mansfield would have placed any
such artificial limit on the writ’s use to challenge such a restraint
on liberty. Further, as Lord Mansfield noted in a subsequent case,
habeas was available “the moment a man land[ed]” in England,

78
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1974 (noting that the United States’s first
extradition treaty was the Jay Treaty of 1794).
79
Id.
80
Id. at 1997 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
81
Somerset v. Stewart (1772), 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (KB).
82
See HALLIDAY, supra note 76, at 175 (“[T]he Somerset judgment did not free a
slave so much as it protected him from deportation.”).
83
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1973.
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thus suggesting the irrelevance of any length of physical presence
within the country in determining access to the writ.84
The refusal of courts to order the return of deserting sailors to
foreign sovereigns similarly demonstrates the practice of using
habeas to remedy restraints on liberty intended to remove a
person from the state’s territory.85 As the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania explained in the case of a Danish sailor who had
deserted his vessel, the sailor must simply be released—rather
than returned—because there was no lawful authority to detain
him for the purpose of “carr[ying him] out of the country.”86 If
habeas did not reach physical restraints aimed at transfer to
another country, those courts could not have ordered deserting
sailors released in the United States. These cases demonstrate
that courts did not draw any hard lines based on the detention’s
ultimate purpose—that is, detention for continued imprisonment
as opposed to detention for transfer. Nor did they hesitate to
exercise habeas review even where release was an effect, rather
than the primary purpose, of that review.
The Thuraissigiam Court’s attempted discussion of
extradition suffers from a similar flaw. Habeas review has
consistently been available in extradition to ensure the executive
cannot dispose of a person’s liberty by expelling them from the
country unless it is consistent with applicable legal requirements,
typically the terms of a statute or an extradition treaty.87 This is
a similar function to habeas’s role in immigration removal cases,
where the legality of removal is measured against legal

84

2 FRANCIS CONST, DECISIONS OF THE KINGS BENCH, UPON THE LAWS RELATING
POOR 331 (London, Whieldon & Butterworth, 3d ed. 1793) (discussing
Somerset’s Case); see R. v. The Inhabitants of Thames Ditton (1785) 99 Eng. Rep. 891,
892 (KB).
85
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Holloway, 1 Serg. & Rawle 392, 396 (Pa. 1815)
(noting that the sailor’s desertion did not violate any domestic law or treaty and
ordering his release); Case of the Deserters from the British Frigate L’Africaine, 3 AM.
L.J. & MISCELLANEOUS REPERTORY 132, 136 (1810) (no authorization to detain and
therefore to transfer sailors to British custody).
86
Holloway, 1 Serg. & Rawle at 396.
87
See, e.g., In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 296, 303 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (considering the
habeas petition of an individual following a demand from Belgium for his extradition
for crimes committed there and recognizing that habeas requires the court to “inquire
and adjudge whether the commissioner acquired jurisdiction of the matter, by
conforming to the requirements of the treaty and the statute”); Gerald L. Neuman,
Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
961, 1003 (1998) (explaining that in extradition cases, courts consistently exercised
habeas jurisdiction to review and adjudicate challenges to the Executive’s ability to
“detain aliens for removal to another country at the request of [the] government”).
TO THE
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requirements contained in immigration statutes and the
Constitution. Courts, for example, routinely consider whether the
particular crime is an extraditable offense, either because the
treaty does not cover it, the requirement of double criminality has
not been satisfied because the offense is not criminal in both
countries as extradition requires,88 or there are procedural defects
such as an improper warrant.89 While the scope of habeas review
of extradition is generally limited,90 and does not typically inquire
into how the extraditee will be treated in the foreign country, it
does include an examination of the legal authority for transfer and
compliance with the terms of an extradition treaty.91 Courts have
never suggested that the purpose of the restraint in extradition—
forcible transfer to another jurisdiction—places the government
action outside of habeas’s purview.92 Habeas courts, moreover,
have reviewed extradition not only to a foreign sovereign, but also

88

See, e.g., Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 847 (1st Cir. 1980).
See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 737 F.2d 950, 952 (11th Cir. 1984) (considering
but rejecting claim that the warrant issued for extradition was invalid).
90
See, e.g., Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2012) (en
banc); Cornejo-Barreto v. Siefert, 379 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g en banc
granted 386 F.3d 938, and vacated as moot 389 F.3d 1307 (2004) (noting that habeas
corpus is available to inquire only whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether
the offense charged is within the extradition treaty, and whether there was any
evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the
accused guilty (citing Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925)).
91
Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 957 (en banc); id. at 960 (Thomas, J., joined by
Wardlaw & Berzon, J.J., concurring in part).
92
The Ninth Circuit’s fractured en banc decision in Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas
illustrates the continued recognition that courts play at least some role in reviewing
extradition cases and that the purpose of restraint (to transfer rather than continue
to detain) by no means places it beyond a court’s habeas jurisdiction. 683 F.3d 952,
956 (9th Cir. 2012). Despite splitting sharply on the scope of judicial review of
extradition orders, the court indicated broad agreement that habeas review ensures
that the executive has legal authority to extradite and that the extradition conforms
to the terms of that positive legal authority—that is, the extradition treaty and
extradition statute. See id. at 958 (Thomas, J., joined by Wardlaw & Berzon, J.J.,
concurring in part); id. at 964 (Tallman, J., joined by Smith & Ikuta, J.J., dissenting)
(“ ‘[T]he Constitution creates no Executive prerogative to dispose of the liberty of the
individual.’ Accordingly, extradition proceedings ‘must be authorized by law’ and
comport with pertinent statutory limits.”) (quoting Valentine v. United States ex rel.
Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936)); id. at 995 (Berzon, J., joined by Fletcher, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting part (citing same)). Even Judge Kozinski, who adopted
the narrowest position on habeas review of extradition challenges, acknowledged that
this review includes determining if the extradition complies with the applicable treaty
and concluded the petitioner’s challenge fell outside the Suspension Clause because
the petitioner had not advanced such a claim. Id. at 1013 (Kozinski, J., dissenting in
part) (noting that petitioner does not assert that the executive lacks authority under
the extradition treaty but rather raises a statutory and regulatory challenge).
89
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from one state to another.93
While judicial decisions on
extraditions by the United States post-date the Founding era, that
is principally because after an early controversy over the
extradition of a sailor to Great Britain during the Adams
administration, the United States did not enter into extradition
treaties with other nations until the mid-nineteenth century,94 and
England did have any extradition treaties prior to 1789.95
Moreover, no subsequent extradition decision suggests that the
nature of the restraint covered by habeas was different than that
which existed in 1789 and which forms the minimum baseline
protected by the Suspension Clause.
In short, while release from restraint has always been
habeas’s central concern, courts have consistently recognized that
this release could result from, and be contingent upon, an
invalidation of detention authority that seeks as its purpose a
prisoner’s intended transfer to another country.96
Indeed,
concerns about unlawful transfers have been important to habeas
at least since the celebrated Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, which
addressed past abuses by prohibiting the sending of prisoners
“beyond the Seas” and thus effectively beyond the reach of the writ
so that the King’s Bench had the opportunity to issue the writ
before any transfer occurred.97 The historical record is devoid of a
93

Neuman, supra note 87, at 1003.
See id. at 995−96. In the Jonathan Robbins affair, Great Britain requested the
extradition of a sailor wanted for murder in connection with a mutiny on a British
warship pursuant to the Jay Treaty of 1794, which included an extradition provision.
President Adams requested that a judge order the suspect to be handed over, despite
the absence of statutory procedures to effectuate the extradition. Id. During the
hearing, the sailor claimed he was a U.S. citizen and had been impressed into the
British Navy. See United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 843 (D.S.C. 1799). The judge
did not credit the sailor’s citizenship claim, but ruled that the extradition would be
lawful regardless because Robins fell within the treaty’s terms and because the treaty
was valid. Id. at 832−33. Following his hand-over to Great Britain, the sailor was
tried, convicted, and hanged, and the case became a cause célèbre. See Neuman, supra
note 87, at 995. As a result of the Robins affair, the United States did not enter into
another extradition treaty until the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, also with
Great Britain (the Jay Treaty expired in 1806). See id. at 996. The Robbins affair does
not merely explain the delayed practice of extradition; it also suggests that habeas
provided for review of the legality of an extradition, as the judge who approved
Robbins’ hand-over to Great Britain did so on the merits.
95
Neuman, supra note 87, at 995.
96
Id. at 1003.
97
Habeas Corpus Act 1679, (1679), 31 Cha. 2, § 12 (Eng.); see also Gerald L.
Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause after Boumediene v. Bush, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 537, 568 n.161 (discussing the 1679 Act). The 1679 Act made such
unlawful transfers not only a criminal offense but also a virtually unpardonable one.
Id. at 568.
94
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single instance where a judge deemed a restraint on liberty,
including one aimed at a prisoner’s involuntary transfer or
removal from a state’s territory, to be beyond the writ’s scope due
to the fact that its purpose was to forcibly remove the prisoner
from the territory rather than keep them imprisoned within it.
Further, conditional release has always been a wellrecognized remedy in habeas. Judges historically exercised broad
remedial power on habeas and exercised this power flexibly.98 This
practice, moreover, has continued over time. In post-conviction
habeas cases, for example, where petitioners seek to invalidate
their conviction based on an asserted constitutional error, they
typically obtain a new trial, not release, as an immediate remedy.99
Similarly, when courts find habeas petitioners detained based on
the unlawful exercise of military authority, they typically grant
release conditionally—that is only if the government fails to
present a lawful basis for confinement, such as the presentment of
criminal charges, within a specified time period.100 Thus, there is
nothing anomalous in the fact that Thuraissigiam’s habeas
petition did not seek his immediate release—indeed, it could not
have since Thuraissigiam would have become potentially eligible
for bond only after first establishing a credible fear of
persecution.101
The Thuraissigiam majority’s view that habeas is
traditionally limited to seeking what it terms “simple release”—
ignores its longstanding use to challenge forcible transfers to
another jurisdiction or to provide for various forms of conditional
release102—misconstrues historical practice and understandings of
the writ. As Paul Halliday, the leading historian of habeas in
England, has explained, judges “examine[d] detention in all forms”
and sought to ensure that government officials remained within
the bounds of their authority when imposing restrictions on
liberty.103 That the burden remained on the jailor to demonstrate
98
See HALLIDAY, supra note 76, at 59–60 (discussing conditional release and the
other “variety of outcomes” that demonstrates “the equitable flexibility” that common
law judges exercised on habeas); Id. at 117 (discussing historical practice of
conditional release and the wide discretion judges had in employing it).
99
See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CAL.
L. REV. 1, 32 (2010).
100
See, e.g., Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 692 n.14 (D.S.C. 2005), rev’d on
other grounds, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding military detention lawful and thus
also rejecting the conditional remedy of release).
101
See Eunice Lee, The End of Entry Fiction, 99 N.C. L. REV. 565, 613 (2021).
102
See Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1971 (2020).
103
HALLIDAY, supra note 76, at 176.
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the legality of a given detention reflected the background principle
that individuals should otherwise remain free to move about
without physical restraint, even when the purpose of that
restraint is to remove that individual from the territory rather
than to keep them behind bars.104
The Court, moreover, did not simply misinterpret the
historical record in Thuraissigiam, it also applied a methodology
that is at odds with both the historical understanding of the writ
that existed at the Founding and the Court’s own prior decisions
interpreting that history. In determining whether to grant habeas
relief, judges never required a petitioner to show that the writ had
been used in precisely these circumstances or to provide a
precedent on point. For example, in deciding whether to grant
habeas relief, courts did not mandate the prisoner to show that the
writ had previously been used for this precise purpose, instead
treating the writ as dynamic and evolving, rather than static and
fixed.105 As Sir Edward Coke explained, habeas provided judges
with broad equitable powers to ensure errors were corrected and
justice done even in circumstances “where law had not previously
provided the means to do so.”106 And, as explained below, the
Court itself had previously refused to require evidence of a direct
precedent from the historical record in determining whether an
exercise of detention power fell within the historical scope of the
Suspension Clause, most notably in INS v. St. Cyr107 and
Boumediene v. Bush,108 and looked more broadly at the writ’s
purpose and role within the Constitution’s separation-of-powers
framework.109 In Thurassigiam, however, the Court disregarded
this wider historical lens and habeas’s structural role, including
its own repeated statements that the writ’s protections have

104
See ERIC M. FREEDMAN, MAKING HABEAS WORK: A LEGAL HISTORY 80−81
(2018). As Freedman notes, William Blackstone characterized the right of person
liberty in terms of freedom of movement: “[T]he personal liberty of individuals consists
of loco-motion, of changing situation or removing one’s person to whatsoever place
one’s own inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due
course of law.” Id. at 81 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 134 (1765)).
105
See HALLIDAY, supra note 76, at 160 (explaining that common law judges did
not restrict themselves to prior precedents in deciding whether to exercise their
habeas power but rather operated under the “core principle” that “courts might
inspect imprisonment orders made at any time, anywhere, by any authority”).
106
Id. at 87 (citations omitted).
107
533 U.S. 289, 290 (2001).
108
553 U.S. 723, 739–55 (2008).
109
See infra text accompanying notes 258–266.
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always been strongest in the realm of executive detention,110
including detention for purposes of immigration removal.111
B.

The “Finality Era” Cases

The Thuraissigiam Court also rejected petitioner’s reliance on
the “finality era” cases—decisions from 1891 to 1952, when
Congress had sought to preclude judicial review of immigration
orders to the maximum extent allowed under the Constitution.112
In case after case from this period, the Court reviewed decisions
by immigration officials to determine whether the exclusion or
deportation of noncitizens complied with applicable legal
requirements.113 The Thuraissigiam Court, however, concluded
that the cases were decided under the habeas statute and
immigration laws then in force.114 In the Thuraissigiam majority
opinion, Justice Alito wrote that the provision of the 1891 Act
making administrative removal determinations final barred
review only of questions of fact, and not questions about whether
immigration decisions complied with applicable law.115 The review
exercised by federal courts during this period, he said, was
therefore authorized by Congress and failed to support
Thuraissigiam’s contention that the Suspension Clause mandated
review of legal questions.116
Thuraissigiam was wrong to relegate this body of precedent
to the realm of mere statutory interpretation, devoid of
significance for the Suspension Clause.117 In Nishimura Ekiu v.

110
See, e.g., Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 386 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring);
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
111
See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301.
112
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1992–93 (2020); see Act of Mar. 3, 1891, § 8,
26 Stat. 1085 (“All decisions made by the inspection officers or their assistants
touching the right of any alien to land, when adverse to such right, shall be final unless
appeal be taken to the superintendent of immigration, whose action shall be subject
to review by the Secretary of the Treasury.”). Congress maintained the bar in
subsequent immigration statutes that remained in effect until 1952. See Neuman,
supra note 87, at 1004–08 (discussing the era).
113
See Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 663–64 (1892); Gonzales v. Williams,
192 U.S. 1, 13 (1904); Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 9–10 (1915); Won v. White, 256 U.S.
399, 401–02 (1921); U.S. ex rel. Polymeris v. Trudell, 284 U.S. 279, 280–81 (1932); U.S.
ex rel. Johnson v. Shaugnessy, 336 U.S. 806, 808 (1949).
114
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1976.
115
Id.; see also id. at 1980−81.
116
Id. at 1976, 1980−81.
117
Id. at 1980 (“[T]he Court exercised habeas jurisdiction in the finality era cases
because the habeas statute conferred that authority, not because it was required by
the Suspension Clause.”).
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United States,118 decided shortly after the 1891 Act’s passage, the
Court addressed a habeas petition challenging the exclusion of a
Japanese national based on the government’s assertion that she
was likely to become a public charge.119 The Court assumed that
the Act precluded all review of immigration removal decisions,
regardless of whether the claim raised a legal or factual issue, and
thus viewed the question presented as whether “by the
constitution [the petitioner] had a right to the writ of habeas
corpus.”120 It concluded that the Act barred review only of factual
determinations, which it delegated to the discretion of federal
immigration agents.121 While the Court did not specifically
mention the Suspension Clause by name in Nishimura Ekiu, its
framing and resolution of the issue presented—and its conclusion
that the Act could be upheld only if interpreted to bar review of
the agency’s factual determinations—shows it believed that some
review of immigration removal decisions through habeas corpus
was constitutionally guaranteed.122 The following year in Fong
Yue Ting v. United States,123 when evaluating the deportation
procedures for certain Chinese immigrants, the Court again noted
that the Constitution imposes some limit on Congress’s ability to
assign removal proceedings to executive branch agents,124 and
again distinguished factual determinations that Congress could
assign to executive branch officials without judicial inquiry.125 In
cases that followed, the Court continued to maintain the
availability of habeas to challenge immigration removal decisions
except when a petitioner contested factual findings.126 Most

118

142 U.S. 651, 661–62 (1892).
Id. at 661–62.
120
Ekiu v. United States, 12 S. Ct. 336, 338 (1892).
121
Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 660 (acknowledging that Congress could entrust “the final
determination” of the facts on which a noncitizen’s right to enter the United States
depends).
122
Id. at 659−60 (noting that a noncitizen prevented from entering the United
States, and “thereby restrained of his liberty, is doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is lawful”).
123
149 U.S. 698 (1893).
124
Id. at 713−14 (noting that power to expel or exclude noncitizens may be “vested
in the political departments of the government . . . except so far the judicial
department has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the
paramount law of the constitution, to intervene”).
125
See id. at 714.
126
See, e.g., Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 9 (1915) (noting that the 1891 Act’s
provision that made immigration agents’ decisions conclusive refers only to
“conclusiveness upon matters of fact”).
119
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notably, in Heikkila v. Barbara,127 the Court, after reviewing its
jurisprudence throughout the finality era period, confirmed that
the finality era statutes had eliminated all judicial review “except
insofar as it was required by the Constitution,” thereby
reaffirming that some review of immigration removal decisions
was constitutionally mandated.128 Justice Alito’s revisionist
treatment of the finality era cases in Thuraisiggiam—
transforming them into mere interpretations of federal statutes
rather than of the Constitution’s habeas guarantee by failing to
mention the Suspension Clause expressly by name129—
fundamentally misconstrues those cases on their own terms as
well as their prior interpretation in St. Cyr, where the Court
treated them as having constitutional significance.130
C.

The Court’s Recent Suspension Clause Precedents

In denying the Suspension Clause challenge in
Thuraissigiam, the Court distinguished two precedents,
Boumediene and St. Cyr, and relied heavily on a third, Munaf.131
1.

Boumediene

The Thuraissigiam Court distinguished Boumediene, its most
recent and most comprehensive Suspension Clause decision, on
the ground that it did not involve immigration. Instead, the Court
said that Boumediene concerned alleged “suspected foreign
terrorists” held by the military who “sought only to be released
from Guantanamo, not to enter this country” and that “nothing in
the Court’s discussion of the Suspension Clause suggested that
they could have used habeas as a means of gaining entry.”132
But Boumediene did not treat the habeas writ protected by the
Suspension Clause as being contingent on the purpose behind the
physical
restraint.
Instead,
the
Court
found
it
“uncontroversial . . . that the privilege of habeas corpus entitles
the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he
127

345 U.S. 229 (1953).
Id. at 234–35.
129
Ekiu v. U.S., 142 U.S. 651, 660; Kovarsky, supra note 32, at 40 (“What the
Thuraissigiam majority was really doing was taking the absence of decisional
language citing the Suspension Clause as the originating source of the Privilege and
interpreting that absence to mean that the Privilege did not in fact cover the custody
at issue.”).
130
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302–04 (2001).
131
See infra notes 129, 139, and 152 and accompanying text.
132
See Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1981 (2020).
128
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is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or
interpretation’ of relevant law,” and cited St. Cyr, an immigration
case.133 The Court also emphasized a habeas court’s power “to
order the conditional release of an individual unlawfully
detained.”134 Neither the Boumediene Court, nor the dissenting
opinions, suggested that the conditional nature of the release
remedy affected an individual’s constitutional entitlement to the
writ. To the contrary, in both Boumediene and Thuraissigiam, the
petitioners invoked habeas to challenge the legality of the
restraint, even if it would only ultimately, but not immediately,
result in their freedom from physical confinement.135
The
Boumediene petitioners argued the restraint was illegal because it
did not comport with the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military
Force (“2001 AUMF”), which was the statute the government
relied on for the detention;136 and Thuraissigiam argued the
restraint was unlawful because it did not comply with the
requirements of immigration law, specifically, the congressionally
mandated procedures for adjudicating asylum claims.137 In both
cases, the petitioners thus challenged the legality of the
executive’s specific use of detention to control their bodies, even if
prevailing would only “collateral[ly],” and less immediately, result
in their actual release.138

133

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (quoting St. Cyr, 553 U.S. at

302).
134

Id. In thus allowing for conditional release, the Boumediene Court accepted the
government’s contention that it should be afforded another opportunity to obtain a
lawful order justifying the petitioners’ detention. See Supplemental Brief for
Respondents at 9, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (No. 06-1195).
135
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 728-29.
136
Id. at 728–29; Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001) (authorizing the use of necessary and appropriate military force
against those nations, organizations, and persons responsible for the 9/11 attacks and
those who harbored them).
137
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1968.
138
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 728–29; Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1966, 1974
(“The relief that a habeas court may order and the collateral consequences of that
relief are two entirely different things.”). Indeed, the Boumediene Court held that the
Suspension Clause protected detainees at Guantanamo even though they had no
independent right to move freely around the U.S. naval base there, and there was no
guarantee that any country would accept them if their detentions were invalidated.
So the Guantanamo detainees’ claim necessarily included a request to be released
from unlawful detention within a territory in which they had no freestanding or
preexisting right to remain, just like Thuraissigiam.
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St. Cyr

In St. Cyr, the Court construed provisions of two statutes—
IIRIRA and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (“AEDPA”)139—that purported to eliminate judicial review of
final orders of deportation for noncitizens convicted of certain
crimes.140 In holding that the provisions did not eliminate this
review, the Court reaffirmed what the finality era cases had
demonstrated: “Because of [the Suspension] Clause, some ‘judicial
intervention in deportation cases’ is unquestionably ‘required by
the Constitution.’ ”141 It further concluded that eliminating review
over the particular claims in St. Cyr, which asserted legal
eligibility for a form of discretionary relief from deportation,
would, at a minimum, raise “a serious Suspension Clause issue,”
and thus, the Court refused to find that the acts eliminated
jurisdiction over those claims.142 The Thuraissigiam Court,
however, quickly dismissed St. Cyr and its extensive Suspension
Clause analysis, stating that St. Cyr addressed only the writ’s use
by noncitizens already in the country who were held in custody
pending deportation, and thus had no bearing on Thuraissigiam’s
challenge.143 The Court also noted that St. Cyr invoked several
other canons of statutory construction, in addition to the doctrine
of constitutional avoidance, to evaluate the Suspension Clause.144
Like its treatment of Boumediene, the Thuraissigiam Court’s
cursory treatment of St. Cyr is unpersuasive. Thuraissigiam
ignored St. Cyr’s admonition that the Suspension Clause’s
protections are strongest for challenges to executive action without
any prior judicial inquiry,145 thus avoiding any discussion of the
writ’s structural role in immigration removal. It also disregarded
St. Cyr’s refusal to insist on identifying an exact fit in the historical
record to find that an exercise of detention power was covered by
the Suspension Clause and ignored how St. Cyr instead relied on
the “deeper historical principles” that emanated from the writ’s
“ ‘historical core.’ ”146 In Thuraissigiam, Justice Alito further
139
8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(1), 1252(a)(2)(C), 1252(b)(9); Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1214 § 401.
140
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 297–300.
141
Id. at 300 (quoting Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235 (1953)).
142
Id. at 305.
143
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1981.
144
Id.
145
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298–99.
146
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 2009 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301).
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discounted the long history of immigration removal decisions the
Court had reviewed in St. Cyr to assess the petitioner’s Suspension
Clause challenge and cited affirmatively as supporting at least
some constitutionally mandated judicial review of immigration
removal.147 While St. Cyr involved the deportation of a long-time
resident, many of the cases it discussed and endorsed from the
finality period involved noncitizens who were detained at the
border148 and who thus fell under the former category of exclusion,
as opposed to deportation, before Congress combined the two
under the single category of “removal” proceedings in IIRIRA.149
This shows that the Court had always understood that there was
no conceptual difference between the deportation of long-time
residents and the exclusion of noncitizens seized at or just inside
the border for purposes of determining whether the physical
restraint falls within a court’s constitutional habeas power.
Instead, any difference relates to what substantive protections a
noncitizen might be able to invoke, or merits claims they might be
able to raise in their respective habeas proceedings. Further,
while the relief Thuraissigiam sought was ultimately
discretionary—an immigration judge could still deny him asylum
even if he was deemed eligible for asylum by establishing a wellfounded fear of persecution150—that was also true in several other
immigration cases cited in St. Cyr,151 and indeed in St. Cyr itself.152
3.

Munaf

The Thuraissigiam majority relied heavily on the Court’s
decision in Munaf, which was issued the same day as Boumediene.
However, Thuraissigiam not only misapplied Munaf, which
147

St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 306–07 (discussing cases).
Id. (citing Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 9 (1915)).
149
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2019).
150
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1965 & n.4.
151
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 307 (citing United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,
347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954) (discussing habeas challenge to the denial of suspension of
deportation, a discretionary form of relief based on failure to exercise that discretion
in accord with existing valid regulations)); see also Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at
1994 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
152
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 293 (challenging whether noncitizen, ordered removed
because of a substance abuse conviction, remained legally eligible to seek a
discretionary waiver of removal). In addition, not only do immigration agents lack any
discretion to reject a credible fear claim if the legal standard has been met—thus
triggering the statutory requirement for full removal proceedings—but the credible
fear proceeding also includes screening for withholding of removal, a mandatory, i.e.,
non-discretionary, form of relief. See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 187 n.1
(2013).
148
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involved highly distinct circumstances, but also misread the
decision itself by failing to recognize that it supports the
proposition that habeas provides review of the lawfulness of
physical restraints aimed at a prisoner’s transfer, and not merely
those intended to continue their confinement.
In Munaf, the two U.S. citizens detained by the U.S. military,
acting as part of a multinational force in Iraq, had sought to enjoin
their transfer to Iraqi authorities for criminal prosecution in
connection with acts committed there.153
Over the U.S.
government’s objection, the Court ruled unanimously that there
was jurisdiction under the federal habeas statute even though the
United States was acting as part of an international coalition—the
Multinational Force—Iraq (MNF-I)—because U.S. military
officials retained custody and control over the petitioners.154 The
Court, however, denied relief on the merits—whether that would
have meant enjoining the petitioners’ transfer to Iraqi custody or
granting release as long as it would not result in their unlawful
transfer to Iraqi custody—because granting such relief “would
interfere with Iraq’s sovereign right to ‘punish offenses against its
laws committed within its borders.’ ”155
In Thuraissigiam, Justice Alito wrote that Munaf stood for the
broader proposition that habeas was historically available to seek
only “simple release” from executive detention and was not
available to obtain an “order requiring [persons] to be brought into
this country.”156
Like the Munaf petitioners, he said,
Thuraissigiam thus too sought relief outside the historical core of
habeas corpus protected by the Suspension Clause because he did
not seek simple release but rather an order authorizing him to
remain in the United States.157
As Justice Sotomayor’s dissent observed, Justice Alito
drastically overread Munaf, which addressed a “one-of-a-kind
scenario involving the transfer of individuals between different
sovereigns.”158 In Munaf, the petitioners had traveled voluntarily
to Iraq, allegedly committed crimes there, and were therefore

153

Munaf, 553 U.S. at 692.
Id. at 685–86 (stating that the text of 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1) “makes clear that
actual custody by the United States suffices for jurisdiction, even if that custody could
be viewed as ‘under . . . color of’ another authority, such as the MNF-I”).
155
Id. at 692 (quoting Wilson v. Gerard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957)).
156
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1970–71.
157
Id. at 1971.
158
Id. at 2003 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
154
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wanted for prosecution by Iraqi authorities.159 Granting their
petitions—and enjoining their transfer—would have resulted in “a
court order requiring the United States to shelter them from the
sovereign government seeking to have them answer for alleged
crimes committed within that sovereign’s borders.”160 The Munaf
Court ruled that, in such circumstances, the equitable remedy
provided by habeas was inappropriate.161 Thuraissigiam, by
contrast, was already present in the United States and was
seeking to prevent his involuntary removal based on his right to
remain in the country under federal asylum law.162
But even in Munaf’s highly unusual circumstances, the Court
still reviewed the legality of the petitioners’ transfer from U.S. to
Iraqi custody.163
Specifically, the Munaf Court rejected
petitioners’ argument that an extradition treaty was necessary to
transfer them, thus distinguishing the Court’s prior decision in
Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker,164 which held that the
Constitution prohibited the extradition of a person in the United
States to a foreign country unless authorized by treaty or
statute.165 Because Munaf involved the “transfer to a sovereign’s
authority of an individual captured and already detained in that
sovereign’s territory,” the Munaf Court said, no extradition treaty
was required.166 But the Court also specifically referenced other
positive legal authority for the custodial transfer: the U.N.
Security Council resolutions sanctioning U.S. military operations
in Iraq as part of the MNF-I.167 Those resolutions authorized the
MNF-I, and thus the United States, “to take all necessary
measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and

159

Munaf, 553 U.S. at 679 & 704.
Id. at 694.
161
Id. at 693–94; see also Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 2004 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (noting the comity concerns present in Munaf, where granting habeas
relief would have interfered with Iraq’s sovereign right to punish crimes committed in
its territory and risked “entangle[ment] in the conduct of . . . international relations”)
(quoting Munaf, 553 U.S. at 689).
162
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1967–68.
163
Munaf, 553 U.S. at 704–05.
164
Id. at 704 (citing 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936)).
165
Valentine, 299 U.S. at 9 (“It rests upon the fundamental consideration that the
Constitution creates no executive prerogative to dispose of the liberty of the
individual. Proceedings against him must be authorized by law.”).
166
Munaf, 553 U.S. at 704.
167
Id. at 680, 698; S.C. Res. 1546, ¶¶ 10 & 15 (June 8, 2004); S.C. Res. 1790, ¶ 1
(Dec. 18, 2007).
160
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stability in Iraq.”168 The Supreme Court construed the resolutions
as authorizing the United States, acting as part of the MNF-I, to
serve as Iraq’s jailor and to detain petitioners “at the request of
and on behalf of the Iraqi government.”169 And, as the Solicitor
General noted,170 Congress had empowered the president to
“enforce all relevant [U.N.] Security Council Resolutions
regarding Iraq.”171 Thus, not only did the U.S. military have legal
authority to transfer physical custody of petitioners to Iraq for
prosecution for crimes committed there, but the Court reviewed
this legal authority in exercising habeas jurisdiction.172 While the
Court’s discussion of petitioners’ claim that the United States had
no legal authority to transfer them to Iraqi custody was
regrettably truncated, that discussion reflects the Court’s view of
the claim’s weakness on the merits rather than any question about
a judge’s power to review the claim through habeas.173
The Munaf petitioners also asserted that even if there were
legal authority for the United States to transfer them to Iraqi
custody, the transfer was unlawful because they would likely be
subjected to torture and other mistreatment by Iraq. This
argument had two prongs: one based on the Constitution, and the
Due Process Clause, in particular; and the other based on the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”),174 as implemented
by the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998

168

S.C. Res. 1546, ¶ 10 (June 8, 2004); see also S.C. Res. 1790, ¶ 4 (Dec. 18, 2007)
(noting that the government of Iraq is “responsible for arrest, detention and
imprisonment tasks,” but that the MNF-I should also undertake those activities with
“maximum levels of coordination, cooperation and understanding with the
Government of Iraq”).
169
Munaf, 553 U.S. at 704.
170
Brief for the Federal Parties at 25, 45, Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (Nos. 07-394, 06-1666).
171
See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-243, § 3(a)(2), 116 Stat. 1498, 1501.
172
Munaf, 553 U.S at 679–80.
173
See id. at 704 (“It would be more than odd if the Government had no authority
to no authority to transfer [petitioners] to the very sovereign on whose behalf, and
within whose territory, they are being detained.”).
174
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, art. 3, June 26, 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (“No state party
shall expel, return, (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture.”).
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(“FARR Act”),175 which together prohibit returning individuals to
a country where they face a risk of torture or other mistreatment.
As to the first prong, the Munaf Court did not suggest that
adjudicating petitioners’ constitutional transfer-to-torture claim
would be an improper exercise of habeas jurisdiction.176 Instead,
the Court rejected the constitutional argument on the merits,
based on the need for judicial deference to executive judgments
regarding an assessment of the risk, rooted in principles of
separation of powers and comity.177 And notwithstanding this
limit, the Court recognized that in “a more extreme case,” where
the Executive had determined a petitioner was likely to be
tortured but transferred them regardless, the result might be
different.178
As to the FARR Act and CAT, the Court said the claim had
not been properly raised and therefore declined to decide it.179 The
Court also offered no opinion on whether the claim could be raised
in an amended petition below,180 and noted several obstacles such
a claim would have to overcome, if properly raised.181 But it did
175
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105277, § 2242(b), 112 Stat. 2681-761.
176
See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 692.
177
Id. at 700–03 (“The Judiciary is not suited to second-guess such
determinations—determinations that would require federal courts to pass judgment
on foreign justice systems and undermine the Government’s ability to speak with one
voice in this area.” (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison))).
178
Id. at 702. In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter emphasized the narrowness
of the holding and stated the majority’s caveat should be extended to “a case in which
the probability of torture is well documented, even if the Executive fails to
acknowledge it.” Id. at 706 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., concurring).
179
Id. at 703.
180
Id. at 703 n.6.
181
Id. (questioning, for example, whether CAT’s description of being “return[ed]”
to “a country” would encompass the Munaf petitioners). On remand, one of the two
petitioners from Munaf, Shawki Omar, asserted a non-refoulement claim under the
FARR Act and CAT. See Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2011). In
affirming the district court’s dismissal of the claim in Omar, the D.C. Circuit ruled
that Congress had not provided for judicial review of this claim, explaining that it had
subjected to such review only FARR Act/CAT claims challenging immigration removal
orders based on a risk of torture, and not claims by a military detainee like Omar. Id.
at 17–19. Writing for the panel, then-judge Brett Kavanaugh said that Congress’s
failure to provide for judicial review over Omar’s non-refoulement claim did not violate
the Suspension Clause even if the FARR Act had originally provided him with a
judicially enforceable right to press that claim because Congress had subsequently
eliminated that right in the REAL ID Act of 2005, which specified that only
immigration detainees have a right to judicial review of conditions in the receiving
country. Id. at 19. Judge Kavanaugh, however, recognized that the Suspension Clause
guarantees review over some types of challenges to involuntary transfers to another
sovereign, including those contesting the positive legal authority for the transfer. Id.
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not suggest that adjudicating such a claim on the merits would be
an improper exercise of habeas jurisdiction. Thus, while Munaf
refused to enjoin the hand-over of the two petitioners from U.S. to
Iraqi custody, the decision nonetheless provides support for the
proposition, advanced by the petitioner in Thuraissigiam, that a
habeas judge can review whether the Executive is complying with
any applicable legal obligations restricting the transfer of a person
in U.S. custody to another country, whether the source of the
obligation lies in the Constitution or in positive law.
To be sure, the Munaf Court observed that the petitions
concerned “only American citizens and only the statutory reach of
the writ,” and not its “constitutional scope.”182 Specifically, the
Court relied on the federal habeas statute’s “in custody”
requirement in finding jurisdiction where the United States
operates as part of a multinational force and pursuant to
international legal authority but still exercises physical control
over the prisoner.183 The Court, however, did not suggest there
was any gap between constitutional and statutory habeas with
respect to the writ’s ability to reach forcible transfers of a prisoner
to another country or custodian.184
III. POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF MISREADING THURAISSIGIAM
Thuraissigiam is not simply a wrongly decided case. If read
broadly, it has the potential to weaken the protections provided by
the Suspension Clause not only in immigration law but in other
areas, such as extradition and military cases, as well. It could also
weaken the overall constitutional foundation for judicial review of
detention by the executive.
This Part explores some of
Thuraissigiam’s potential implications. The following Part both
explains why Thuraissigiam should be limited and argues for
ensuring meaningful judicial review of physical restraints through
an interpretation of the Suspension Clause that protects an
evolving form of the habeas writ.

at 24. Omar thus confirmed what Munaf had suggested: that the Suspension
Clause⎯and not merely the habeas statute⎯covers at least some claims challenging
involuntarily transfers, and that the Suspension Clause is not limited to claims
seeking “simple release” from detention.
182
Munaf, 553 U.S. at 685 n.2.
183
Id. at 685–86 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1)).
184
See generally id.
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Judicial Review in Immigration Removal

Thuraissigiam involved an asylum seeker who entered
without inspection and was seized just inside the U.S. border.185 If
read broadly, however, the decision could be expanded to limit the
constitutional right to habeas review for individuals inside the
country seeking to challenge their expedited removal, and not
merely for those seized just after crossing the border, like
Thuraissigiam. The decision, for example, could “threaten foreign
students, foreign temporary workers[,] and others lawfully
present” in the United States “for a limited number of years.”186
Additionally, the Thuraissigiam Court’s discussion of possible
limits on the Suspension Clause’s application to immigration
removal based on the 1789 writ could be misread in a way that
encourages Congress to attempt to narrow judicial review for
noncitizens facing immigration removal in other contexts. Even
without such congressional action, the decision could affect how
courts interpret ambiguities and gaps in existing immigration
statutes depending on whether they view Thurassigiam as
altering background assumptions about the availability of habeas
corpus review for noncitizens in the United States.187
To be sure, Thuraissigiam’s potential impact will likely be
cushioned⎯at least in the short-term⎯by the change in
administration. Shortly after taking office, President Biden
revoked former President Trump’s executive order that opened the
door to sweeping and aggressive immigration enforcement within
the United States by Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) while the agency undertook a review of policies and
practices.188 Moreover, even Trump’s threats to expand expedited
removal into the interior of the country appear to have had limited
impact on the ground: not only did a district court previously
enjoin the Trump administration’s attempted expansion of
expedited removal to all persons within the country for less than

185
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1967. Thuraissigiam also had no prior connections
to the United States, which the Court cited in connection with its Due Process Clause
analysis. See id. at 1963–64.
186
Neuman, supra note 17.
187
Id.
188
The White House, Executive Order on the Revision of Civil Immigration
Enforcement Policies and Priorities, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 20, 2021)
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/20/executiveorder-the-revision-of-civil-immigration-enforcement-policies-and-priorities/
[https://perma.cc/J3DA-JZJZ].
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two years (the statutory limit),189 but there is no evidence that
expedited removal had been widely applied far from the border. In
March 2022, the Biden administration
rescinded Trump’s
expansion of expedited removal procedures to the maximum
extent permitted by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).190
The Biden administration, however, also stated that the Secretary
of Homeland Security maintained discretion to extend expedited
removal procedures to additional classes of noncitizens in the
future.191 The administration, moreover, has continued to use
expedited removal procedures for migrant families whom
immigration officials determined did not qualify for asylum after
an initial screening at the U.S.-Mexico border.192 The
administration has additionally defended its authority to
summarily expel asylum seekers due to the public health
emergency caused by COVID-19.193
The Biden administration’s response to the current challenges
posed by COVID-19 thus underscores the continued risk that the
United States will continue to use expedited removal—at least in
some form—to deter asylum seekers when deemed necessary.
Congress could eliminate expedited removal as part of an
immigration reform package or other legislation. Alternatively, it
189
Make the Road N.Y. v. McAleenan, 405 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11, 53 (D.D.C. 2019)
(enjoining President Trump’s expansion of expedited removal for violating the
Administrative Procedure Act and the Due Process Clause), rev’d, 962 F.3d 612 (D.C.
Cir. 2020) (reversing grant of preliminary injunction and remanding for further
proceedings).
190
See Recision of the Notice of July 23, 2019, “Designating Aliens for Expedited
Removal,” 87 Fed. Reg. 16022 (Mar. 21, 2022).
191
Id.
192
See Sabrina Rodriguez, Biden Administration Renews Title 42 Order, as ACLU
Fights Back, POLITICO (Aug. 2, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/08/02/bidenadministration-sued-aclu-migrant-expulsions-502140
[https://perma.cc/KYM2-UQWG];
Miriam Jordan, U.S. Can Expedite the Removal of Migrant Families, Biden Administration
Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/26/us/expeditedremoval-migrant-families.html; see also Lucas Guttentag, Coronavirus Border Expulsions:
CDC’s Assault on Asylum Seekers and Unaccompanied Minors, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 13,
2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69640/coronavirus-border-expulsions-cdcs-assault-onasylum-seekers-and-unaccompanied-minors/ [https://perma.cc/C2WC-YUWY] (discussing
42 U.S.C. § 265 and the public health powers asserted by the U.S. government to justify the
summary expulsion of asylum seekers at the border during the COVID-19 pandemic, and
critiquing those assertions).
193
In March 2022, the D..C. Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction issued by
the district court that prohibited the government from relying on an emergency
provision in federal public health law to summarily expel asylum seekers to countries
where they could face torture or persecution in light of the government’s nonrefoulement obligations under the INA. See Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas, 17 F. 4th
718, 722 (D. C. Cir. 2022).
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could constrain the government’s expedited removal authority by
statute to its original circumstances to individuals seized within
100 miles of the border and who had been in the United States for
14 days or fewer. Such legislation would help prevent a future
administration from using Thuraissigiam to expand its
unreviewable authority to remove noncitizens outside
Thuraissigiam’s narrow circumstances. Congress could also
mandate more procedural protections for those facing expedited
removal to address the flaws in the administrative treatment of
asylum claims that Thuraissigiam had highlighted, including to
ensure that asylum officers correctly apply the “credible fear”
standard and provide asylum seekers a meaningful opportunity to
establish their claims.194
Yet, risks remain. Congressional action is uncertain, and the
degree to which immigration law enforcement will shift under the
new administration remains to be determined given the potential
for resistance within ICE and changing political imperatives.195
Further, Thuraissigiam suggests the Court’s receptivity to
arguments about how the influx of migrants is overwhelming the
immigration system, should the Biden administration or a future
administration seek to limit judicial review.196 Additionally,
decisions by former Attorney Generals Jeff Sessions and William
Barr limiting asylum—for example, by excluding victims of
domestic and gang violence—along with the Trump
194
See Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1995−96 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see
also Brief for Respondent at 6–7, Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020) (No. 19161) (discussing asylum officer’s lack of knowledge about relevant country conditions,
failure to ask pertinent questions regarding the credible fear determination, and
translation difficulties).
195
César Cuahtémoc & García Hernández, Biden-Harris Immigration Priorities
Signal Big Shift, Raise Many Questions, CRIMMIGRATION (Jan. 21, 2021),
http://crimmigration.com/2021/01/21/biden-harris-immigration-priorities-signal-bigshift-raise-many-questions/21 [https://perma.cc/92MY-SQJX] (discussing possible
resistance by ICE); Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Michael D. Shear, Trump Loyalists Across
Homeland Security Could Vex Biden’s Immigration Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/03/us/politics/biden-trump-immigration.html
(discussing same).
196
See Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1963 (“Every year, hundreds of thousands
of aliens are apprehended at or near the border attempting to enter this country
illegally. . . . It was Congress’s judgment that detaining all asylum seekers until the
full-blown removal process is completed would place an unacceptable burden on our
immigration system and that releasing them would present an undue risk that they
would fail to appear for removal proceedings.”); id. at 1966–67 (“Even without the
added step of judicial review, the credible-fear process and abuses of it can increase
the burdens currently overwhelming our immigration system.”) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
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administration’s appointment of immigration judges with a bias
against granting asylum could remain roadblocks to meritorious
asylum claims,197 as could the multitude of seemingly small
changes that the Trump administration made to the immigration
review system to frustrate the claims of asylum seekers.198
Meanwhile, many “asylum seekers [will] remain vulnerable to
a fast-track deportation system.”199 Thuraissigiam will remain a
proverbial loaded gun for a future administration seeking to
utilize existing legal authority to remove asylum seekers without
judicial review, as well as to a future Congress bent on further
narrowing judicial review over immigration removal.
B.

Physical Transfers Outside Immigration Removal

Thuraissigiam could also have ramifications outside of
immigration removal. There are a variety of other situations
where the government seeks to forcibly transfer a prisoner to a
different jurisdiction or country, such as in extradition and
military detention cases.200 While the habeas statute might
continue to provide a basis for review in such situations,
Thuraissigiam, if read broadly, could weaken the constitutional
foundations for judicial review over such transfers and make them
more vulnerable to restriction by Congress.
1.

Transfers between Jurisdictions in the United States

Although Thuraissigiam did not address the question of interjurisdictional prisoner transfers within the United States, the
decision could inject new uncertainty into whether those transfers
would fall within the Suspension Clause. Such transfers or interstate extraditions can occur, for example, between federal

197

Julia Preston, Biden Will Try to Unmake Trump’s Immigration Agenda. It Won’t be
Easy, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 23, 2020) https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/11/23/
biden-will-try-to-unmake-trump-s-immigration-agenda-it-won-t-be-easy [https://perma.cc/
DR2R-M3A3] (discussing the appointment of immigration judges).
198
See Sarah Stillman, The Race to Dismantle Trump’s Immigration Policies,
NEW YORKER (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/02/08/therace-to-dismantle-trumps-immigration-policies (discussing the hundreds of “quiet
measures” made by the Trump administration, as detailed by the Immigration Policy
Tracking Project established by Lucas Guttentag).
199
Sarah Libowsky & Krista Oehlke, President Biden’s Immigration Executive
Actions: A Recap, LAWFARE (Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.lawfareblog.com/presidentbidens-immigration-executive-actions-recap [https://perma.cc/X832-6XEA].
200
See Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1974.
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jurisdictions or between federal and state jurisdictions.201
Prisoners can also challenge their future detention by another
jurisdiction through habeas based, for example, on a detainer
lodged by that jurisdiction.202 In Rumsfeld v. Padilla,203 the
Supreme Court distinguished these challenges to future physical
custody as lying outside the traditional “core” of habeas,204 thus
finding that they warranted an exception to the ordinary
requirement under the federal habeas statute that a petition be
brought against the immediate custodian.205 Thuraissigiam could
be read to suggest another possible distinction from what the
Court has termed “core” habeas—petitions seeking simple release
rather than those challenging transfer. Thuraissigiam does not
purport to disturb the rulings in domestic habeas cases involving
multiple jurisdictions, but the decision, if construed broadly, might
be read to suggest not only some hierarchy of protected habeas
interests, but also the relevance of a factor—the detention’s
purpose—that is particularly vulnerable to manipulation by the
government.
2.

Extradition

As noted above, Thuraissigiam misconstrues longstanding
extradition jurisprudence, particularly in suggesting that those
cases involve “nothing more” than the use of habeas to seek release
from detention.206 In extradition cases, courts routinely decide
whether to block a prisoner’s transfer by the United States to a
foreign country because the extradition lacks legal authority or
violates the terms of an extradition statute or treaty,207 even if
201
See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Hoover v. Franzen, 669 F.2d 433, 435 (7th Cir. 1982)
(habeas petition challenging transfer of prisoners from state to federal custody).
202
See, e.g., Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 484 (1973); Nelson
v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229−30 (1970) (holding that federal court in California had
jurisdiction to examine the validity of a North Carolina sentence while prisoner began
serving that sentence and while under a detainer filed by North Carolina, after
prisoner exhausted administrative remedies in California); see also Strait v. Laird,
406 U.S. 341, 344 (1972) (holding that an inactive army reservist in California can
seek habeas relief against commanding officer in Indiana from his military
obligations).
203
542 U.S. 426 (2004).
204
Id. at 441, 443.
205
Id. at 444−46.
206
See Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1974 (2020); supra notes 63–79 and
accompanying text.
207
See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Cornejo-Barreto
v. Siefert, 379 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[H]abeas corpus is available only to
inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is
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courts generally decline to look at the adequacy or fairness of the
procedures used to try an extraditee in the receiving country under
the rule of non-inquiry.208 While an extradition proceeding is not
itself designed to confer lawful status in the United States, it
shows the use of habeas to enjoin a restraint on liberty intended
to effectuate the transfer of a person to another country to face
trial there, and not solely to secure the person’s release from
custody.209 The remedy of release is thus contingent upon an
invalidation of the government’s legal authority to transfer.
Thuraissigiam does not purport to disturb extradition caselaw.210
But because Thuraissigiam appears to question the constitutional
underpinnings of habeas review for anything other than what the
Court characterizes as “simple release,”211 it could be misread to
undercut the proposition that the Constitution guarantees review in
extradition cases, especially since the Court noted that the first
extradition cases post-date 1789 and thus might not fall within the
1789 writ protected by the Suspension Clause under Thuraissigiam’s
narrow, and misguided, historical interpretation.212
3.

Military Cases

Were Thuraissigiam to be misread as defining the full reach
of the habeas writ protected by the Suspension Clause, as opposed
to a statement, however erroneous, of the scope of the writ in 1789,
there could be an unjustified impact on judicial review in military
within the extradition treaty, and whether there was any evidence warranting the
finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.”) (citing
Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925)), reh’g en banc granted 386 F.3d 938
(9th Cir. 2004) and vacated as moot 389 F.3d 1307 (9th Cir. 2004).
208
See, e.g., Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901) (“When an American citizen
commits a crime in a foreign country, he cannot complain if required to submit to such
modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws of that country may prescribe for
its own people, unless a different mode be provided for by treaty stipulations between
that country and the United States.”); Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 957
(9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (concluding that if the Secretary declares it is not “more likely
than not” that torture will occur, “the court’s inquiry shall have reached its end and
Trinidad y Garcia’s liberty interest shall be fully vindicated”). But see Aguasvivas v.
Pompeo, 405 F. Supp.3d 347, 358–59 (D.R.I. 2019) (finding that the Convention
Against Torture bars the petitioner’s extradition to the Dominican Republic where the
Executive branch determined it was likely he would be tortured), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part and remanded, 984 F.3d 1047 (1st Cir. 2021).
209
See Neely, 180 U.S. at 123.
210
Even if Thuraissigiam’s (flawed) reasoning were extended to extradition
generally, its attempted extension to citizens could be resisted because citizens have
a preexisting right to reside and remain in the United States.
211
See Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1970–71.
212
See id. at 1974.
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detention cases, an area that forms an important part of habeas
jurisprudence, particularly since 9/11. While most early
challenges to military detention in the “War on Terrorism” focused
on the executive’s power to detain and the process for determining
if a detention was lawful,213 subsequent cases addressed the
executive’s authority to transfer detainees to other countries.214
This type of litigation increased following the Supreme Court’s
initial recognition of habeas jurisdiction over military detentions
at Guantanamo,215 and continued as the government sought not
only to wind-down detentions at Guantanamo but also to moot out
litigation challenging more controversial invocations of military
detention authority at Guantanamo and elsewhere by transferring
prisoners to other countries.216 In these cases, habeas petitioners
sought, for example, to challenge the government’s power to
transfer them to another country without a judicial inquiry into
the risk of torture and other abuse217 or without legal authority.218
There has generally been a disconnect between these
decisions, stressing the importance of habeas review of military
detentions, on the one hand,219 and those providing comparatively
213

Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on
Terror, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 353–55 (2010).
214
Jeffrey H. Fisher, Detainee Transfers After Munaf: Executive Deference and the
Convention Against Torture, 43 GA. L. REV. 953, 954 (2009).
215
Initial litigation demanding advance notice to a petitioner’s counsel and the
district court to enable a petitioner to challenge a transfer occurred after the Supreme
Court first recognized statutory habeas jurisdiction over detentions at Guantanamo
in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). See, e.g., Kurnaz v. Bush, Nos. Civ. 04-1135 &
05-0392, 2005 WL 839542, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2005) (motion for preliminary
injunction seeking advance notice of petitioner’s transfer from Guantanamo).
Litigation around detainee transfers accelerated after the Supreme Court recognized
the Guantanamo detainees’ right to habeas corpus under the Suspension Clause in
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). See Fisher, supra note 214, at 945.
216
Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV.
1451, 1478 (2011).
217
See, e.g., Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II), 561 F.3d 509, 513–14 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (claim by Uighur detainees at Guantanamo that they must have the opportunity
to challenge their transfer to another country based on a risk of torture and other
mistreatment); Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (challenge by U.S.
citizen in Iraq to the government’s authority to transfer him to Iraqi custody where
he asserted he would likely be tortured and mistreated).
218
See Doe v. Mattis, 928 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (challenge by a U.S. citizen
detained in Iraq to the United States’ attempt to transfer him to another government
without legal authority for the transfer).
219
See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (“[H]abeas corpus
entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held
pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant law.” (quoting INS
v. St. Cyr, 553 U.S. 289, 302 (2001))); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (holding
that the federal habeas statute extends to the detention of prisoners at Guantanamo);
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little review of military transfers on the other.220 Thuraissigiam
threatens not only to entrench but also widen this distinction
because, in describing the writ that it says existed in 1789,
Thuraissigiam incorrectly draws a sharp distinction between
detention for the purpose of continued imprisonment and
detention for the purpose of transfer to another country and
release there. Whereas prior decisions have stressed international
comity and separation-of-powers concerns as a basis for
limitations on habeas review of military transfers,221
Thuraissigiam could be read to place unfounded focus on the
ultimate purpose of the restraint rather than its legality.
C.

The Constitutional Foundation of Habeas Corpus

Thuraissigiam could weaken the Suspension Clause in an
even more sweeping way to the extent it resurrects the
overarching question of whether the Suspension Clause
independently guarantees the availability of habeas corpus, or
instead prevents only the writ’s temporary withholding or
operation, once Congress has chosen to provide for it. This
“existential question” has profound stakes for the constitutional
foundations of habeas:222 if the Constitution protects only the
latter, Congress can freely deny or restrict access to the writ unless
this restriction qualifies as a suspension and the strict criteria for

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 526 (2004) (stating, in the context of a citizen
detained as an enemy combatant in the United States, that “[t]he simple outline of
[28 U.S.C.] § 2241 makes clear both that Congress envisioned that habeas petitioners
would have some opportunity to present and rebut facts and that courts in cases like
this retain some ability to vary the ways in which they do so as mandated by due
process.”).
220
See, e.g., Kiyemba II, 561 F.3d at 514–15 (finding that Munaf precludes a
judicial inquiry into whether the government has complied with its obligations under
the FARR Act and Convention Against Torture when it transfers a military detainee
to another country); Omar, 646 F.3d at 17–19 (holding that Congress’s elimination of
judicial review over FARR Act/CAT claims by military transferees did not violate the
Suspension Clause). But see Mattis, 928 U.S. at 18–19 (concluding that the U.S.
government required positive legal authority to transfer a U.S. citizen detained as an
“enemy combatant” in Iraq to a third country).
221
See, e.g., Kiyemba II, 561 F.3d at 514–16.
222
Kovarsky, supra note 32, at 29 (“If one believes that the Suspension Clause is
the exclusive source of constitutional habeas law, and if the text of the Clause does no
more than restrict formal suspension, then one could faithfully ask whether there are
any constitutional guarantees for habeas process beyond the [restriction on formal
suspension].”).
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suspension set forth in Article I—a threat to the public safety
created by rebellion or invasion223—have not been satisfied.224
This suggestion, raised in a footnote in the majority opinion,225
would reopen a question that the Court is widely understood to
have settled in Boumediene.226
In Boumediene, which the
Thuraissigiam footnote does not even mention, the Court held that
legislation eliminating habeas corpus for detainees held as enemy
combatants at Guantanamo without providing an adequate
substitute to ensure meaningful judicial review violated the
Suspension Clause.227 As the Boumediene Court explained, the
Suspension Clause “ensures that, except during periods of formal
suspension, the Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the writ,
to maintain the ‘delicate balance of governance’ that is itself the
surest safeguard of liberty.”228 Boumediene thus appeared to
223

U.S. Const. art. I § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.”).
224
See Kovarsky, supra note 32, at 42. For other discussions of whether the
Suspension Clause provides an independent guarantee for the writ’s availability or
merely restricts its temporary withholding once Congress has chosen to create lower
courts and grant them habeas jurisdiction, see, for example, Edward A. Hartnett, The
Constitutional Puzzle of Habeas Corpus, 46 B.C. L. REV. 251, 251–52 (2005); Stephen
I. Vladeck, The Riddle of the One-Way Ratchet, 12 GREEN BAG 2D 71, 72 (2008)
(“[U]nless Congress had to create lower federal courts and confer upon them
jurisdiction over federal habeas petitions . . . individuals in federal custody might be
left without a forum in which to contest the legality of their detention, even in cases
where the ‘Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus’ has not been properly suspended.”).
225
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1969 n.12 (2020). The footnote prompted
responses from Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion, see id. at 1984 (Thomas, J.,
concurring), and Justice Sotomayor in her dissenting opinion. See id. at 1997 n.1
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
226
See Kovarsky, supra note 32, at 24 n.4 (“Virtually everyone understood the
Supreme Court to have decided that the Constitution contained an affirmative
guarantee of habeas process to those detained under color of American law.”); Fallon,
supra note 213, at 378 (“Boumediene clearly held, for the first time, that the
Suspension Clause protects a right to habeas . . . and that it does not merely prohibit
complete withdrawals of whatever habeas rights Congress might have chosen to
provide at any particular time.”).
227
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008).
228
See id. at 745 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004)). Further,
Justice Scalia, who had previously toyed with the idea that the Suspension Clause
itself provides no guarantee of habeas corpus, subsequently abandoned that position.
See Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1997 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Justice
Scalia’s dissenting opinion in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), and his later
abandonment of that position in Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507). In St. Cyr, Justice Scalia had
stated that the Suspension Clause does not “guarantee any content to” nor guarantee
“the existence of” habeas corpus. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But
then in Hamdi, Justice Scalia said the Suspension Clause independently guarantees
a citizen in the United States the right not to be detained without charge or trial
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eliminate any lingering uncertainty over whether the Suspension
Clause provided a source of habeas rights by confirming that it
affirmatively guaranteed both the existence of and some minimum
content to the habeas writ.229 It also highlighted that, by
affirmatively guaranteeing a judicial role in the realm of
detentions, the Suspension Clause protects important structural
as well as individual interests.230
While a full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this
Article, the Article maintains that the Suspension Clause
guarantees the availability of habeas, without deciding whether
the guarantee originates exclusively in the Suspension Clause,231
or in the Suspension Clause in conjunction with either the Article
III judicial power that is triggered once Congress ordains and
establishes Article III courts,232 and/or as a constitutional norm
unless Congress suspends the writ, thus acknowledging that the Suspension Clause
affirmatively guarantees the habeas writ, and limiting any dispute to the breadth of
that guarantee. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229
Previously, the Court suggested in dicta that even though the Suspension
Clause did not affirmatively guarantee the writ, it nevertheless imposed on Congress
an obligation to make it available to ensure “the [habeas] privilege itself would [not]
be lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted.” Ex parte Bollman, 8
U.S. 74, 95 (1807) (noting that the First Congress “must have felt, with peculiar force,
the obligation of providing efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege
should receive life and activity; for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself
would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted”); see also Amanda
L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 340–42 (2006);
Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After INS v. St. Cyr, 33
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 555, 580–81 (2002) (suggesting that the Constitution
obligates Congress to provide some means through which the writ will be effective).
For a discussion of how Boumediene resolves the questions raised by the Bollman
dicta—and confirms that the Clause affirmatively guarantees the habeas writ, see
FREEDMAN, supra note 104, at 108–09.
230
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765–66 (“[T]he writ of habeas corpus is itself an
indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers. The test for
determining the scope of this provision must not be subject to manipulation by those
whose power it is designed to restrain”); id. at 765 (“To hold the political branches
have the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will [by denying access to the
writ based on a prisoner’s location] would permit a striking anomaly in our tripartite
system of government, leading to a regime in which Congress and the President, not
this Court, say ‘what the law is.’ ” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177
(1803)).
231
Id.at 768 (discussing “rights under the Suspension Clause”).
232
See Lee Kovarsky, A Constitutional Theory of Habeas Power, 99 VA. L. REV.
753, 774 (2013); FREEDMAN, supra note 104, at 107 (“One of the attributes of the
‘judicial power’ that Article III grants is the inherent authority to grant writs of
habeas corpus in the absence of a valid suspension.”). While Boumediene grounds the
habeas guarantee in the Suspension Clause, it also draws on notions of Article III
judicial power in describing the structural role served by the writ in maintaining the
proper separation of powers. See supra text accompanying note 230.
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rooted in a preexisting habeas privilege that the Constitution
carries over.233 The suggestion that the Constitution protects only
against an improper suspension, without providing any
affirmative guarantee of the writ, is irreconcilable with
Boumediene and its discussion of the Suspension Clause’s role in
protecting both individual and structural interests. It is also
irreconcilable with the Framers’ view of the writ’s importance.
Indeed, the Framers considered habeas so sacrosanct that the only
source of controversy at the Convention was whether Congress
could ever suspend the writ, and not whether the Constitution
guaranteed it.234 As Lee Kovarsky has observed, “the originalist
and structural cases for recognizing an affirmative habeas
guarantee are overwhelming[,]” and the Suspension Clause’s text
“plainly reads as an assumption that the Constitution guarantees
habeas [corpus],” even if it does not expressly provide for the writ’s
existence and discusses only its possible withdrawal.235
It seems unlikely that the Court will embrace the suggestion
in the Thuraissigiam footnote, if not for its lack of support or its
direct contradiction with Boumediene, then for the doctrinal
complications it would create for preserving a habeas guarantee in
cases involving U.S. citizens, which might find a more receptive
audience among the Thuraissigiam majority, as Justice Scalia
undoubtedly realized in Hamdi. But the Court could still persist
in invoking questions around the existence of any constitutional
habeas guarantee as rhetorical support for narrower
interpretations of the Suspension Clause that dilute its strength
and limit its scope without ever deciding if such an underlying
guarantee exists, as the Court did in Thuraissigiam. The risk of
continued erosion of the Suspension Clause posed by
Thuraissigiam thus underscores the value of developing a
framework for explaining why habeas corpus is not limited to the
writ that existed in 1789, which the Thuraissigiam Court so
fundamentally misunderstood, but also protects an evolving
habeas privilege. The next section turns to these questions as it
considers the Suspension Clause after Thuraissigiam.
233

See Kovarsky, supra note 32, at 28–29 (discussing this theory).
Id.; see also Eric M. Freedman, The Suspension Clause in the Ratification
Debates, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 451, 468 (1996) (arguing that, on the whole, historical
materials suggest the Constitution’s drafters agreed on “protecting broadly against
Congressional interference with the power that federal and state courts were each
assumed to possess: to order the release on habeas corpus of both federal and state
prisoners.”).
235
Kovarsky, supra note 32, at 44.
234
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IV. THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE AFTER THURAISSIGIAM
Despite Thurassigiam’s deeply problematic and potentially
far-reaching implications, it presented only the narrow question of
the Suspension Clause’s application to a noncitizen seized just
yards inside the U.S. border who sought to challenge his expedited
removal.236 It did not address the application of the Suspension
Clause to other noncitizens facing expedited removal, such as
those who were residing in the interior of the country or who had
previous connections to the United States, let alone to noncitizens
facing deportation generally.237 Nor did it address other possible
claims by asylum seekers or other individuals held pursuant to the
government’s expedited removal authority, such as direct
challenges to their continued detention or to the conditions of that
detention.238 Thuraissigiam, in short, ultimately addressed the
Suspension Clause’s application to only one situation of detention
during asylum screening, with very specific attributes, despite its
potentially broader implications.
Most significantly, however, Thuraissigiam addressed only
the writ that existed in 1789,239 and explicitly declined to consider
whether or how the Suspension Clause might protect the writ as
it has evolved over time.240
Thus, because Thuraissigiam
jettisoned the Court’s prior understanding of the 1789 writ and its
own precedents through the multiple critical errors described
above,241 the decision places renewed importance on interpreting
the Suspension Clause as protecting an evolving form of the
habeas writ.
The Supreme Court has yet to engage in a sustained
examination of whether, and to what degree, the Suspension
Clause protects an evolving form of the writ. In several decisions
236
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1969 (2020) (holding that the Suspension
Clause does not cover noncitizens “claim[ing] the right to enter or remain in a country
or to obtain administrative review potentially leading to that result”).
237
Id. at 1981 (“The writ of habeas corpus as it existed at common law provided a
vehicle to challenge all manner of detention by government officials, and the Court
had held long before that the writ could be invoked by aliens already in the country
who were held in custody pending deportation. St. Cyr reaffirmed these
propositions . . . .”).
238
See Kovarsky, supra note 32, at 36 n.89.
239
See Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1971; see also id. at 1974–75 (“Despite
pages of rhetoric, the dissent is unable to cite a single pre-1789 habeas case in which
a court ordered relief that was anything like what [Thuraissigiam] seeks here.”).
240
See id. at 1969 (explaining that Thuraissigiam had not advanced any
argument that the Suspension Clause extends any further than the 1789 writ).
241
See supra Part II.
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from the post-conviction review context, the Court raised but did
not decide this issue, even as it assumed “that the Suspension
Clause of the Constitution refers to the writ as it exists today,
rather than as it existed in 1789.”242 In St. Cyr, the Court did not
confront this question because it concluded first, that the
Suspension Clause guarantees some review of deportation orders
and, second, that even if Suspension Clause protects only the writ
that existed in 1789, a judge would likely have exercised habeas
review over the legal claim presented by the petitioner.243
As explained below, the Suspension Clause should be
interpreted to protect not only the habeas writ that existed in
1789, but also as it has evolved over time.244 Viewing the habeas
guarantee as capable of adapting and evolving in light of changing
circumstances and understandings provides another way to avoid
potentially overbroad readings of Thuraissigiam while remaining
loyal to the writ’s history, original understanding, and purpose.
This approach would help ensure that asylum seekers and others
who seek to challenge their removal or transfer remain within the
reach of the writ secured by the Constitution.
This Part describes why the Suspension Clause should be
interpreted to include evolving uses and understandings of the
writ based on its original public meaning, subsequent history and
practice; the need to minimize the risk of circumvention; and the
Court’s own interpretation of related constitutional provisions
that protect liberty and personal security. Next, the Part describes
how the changing nature and increasing variety of restraints on
liberty illustrates the importance of interpreting the Suspension
Clause in this manner. The Part then discusses the possibility, as
well as potential shortcomings, of sourcing the guarantee of
judicial review of detention in another constitutional provision,
such as the Due Process Clause, to the exclusion of the Suspension
Clause.

242
See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663–64 (1996); see also Swain v.
Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 380 n.13 (1977) (suggesting, without holding, that Congress
may not “totally repeal all post-18th century developments in [habeas] law.”).
243
See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 304–05 (2001) (“In sum, even assuming that
the Suspension Clause protects only the writ as it existed in 1789, there is
substantial evidence to support the proposition that pure questions of law like the one
raised by the respondent in this case could have been answered in 1789 by a commonlaw judge with power to issue the writ of habeas corpus.”).
244
See infra Sections IV.A–E.
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Original Public Meaning of the Suspension Clause

The original public meaning of the Suspension Clause
supports interpreting it to protect a habeas writ capable of
evolving over time.245 Not only was there a widely shared belief
among participants in debates over the Constitution that “the
maintenance of a vigorous writ was indispensable to the political
freedom of individuals.”246 But the habeas writ with which the
Framers were familiar had itself evolved continuously throughout
history to ensure that judicial power was sufficient to protect
against new types of liberty deprivations developed by a growing
state.247 This evolution and expansion, moreover, came mainly
from judges as part of their effort to assert control over the
administrative apparatus of the Crown.248 As Professor Paul
Freund explained over a half century ago—and as Paul D.
Halliday’s research has since exhaustively documented249—courts
in pre-ratification England frequently issued habeas corpus to
reach new claims and forms of detention, and “the whole history
of habeas corpus shows that the courts in England were capable of
developing the writ, and we did not adopt an institution frozen as
of that date.”250 Thus, the Framers would have naturally
understood the habeas writ as “a flexible, adaptable, and evolving
245
The original public meaning refers to “the conventional semantic meaning that
the words and phrases had at the time the provision was framed and ratified.”
Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 923, 926 (2009).
246
See ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF
LIBERTY 14 (2003).
247
See Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English
Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 585, 700
(2008) (noting the evolution of habeas corpus not only since the Framing period, but
in early modern England, where it expanded over time); HALLIDAY, supra note 76, at
101–02 (describing how common law judges employed habeas to reach new types of
physical restraints, including apprenticeship, slavery, and naval impressment); id. at
76, at 120–21 (explaining how common law judges “broadened their definition of
detention in a way that expanded their oversight to all aspects of life that might
generate one person’s constraint of another”).
248
See HALLIDAY, supra note 76, at 113–14 (discussing use in impressment cases);
Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the 1996
Immigration Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509, 2526 (1998) (discussing habeas review of
actions by quasi-executive agencies such as the Sewers Commission).
249
See generally HALLIDAY, supra note 76.
250
See Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941,
991 (2011) (quoting Willard Hurst, The Role of History, in SUPREME COURT AND
SUPREME LAW 59, 61 (Edmond Cahn ed., 1971) (quoting Professor Freund’s remarks
given at an NYU symposium celebrating the sesquicentennial of Marbury v.
Madison)); see also id. at 990–91 (discussing arguments made by Professor Freund as
counsel in United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952)).
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remedy,” and resisted any notions that it was cabined to a set of
specific precedents or factual circumstances at a given period in
time.251 As such, there is a strong historical basis for considering
an expectation of this evolution to be part of the Suspension
Clause’s original public meaning and for incorporating this
historical understanding when determining an evolving habeas
privilege protected by the Suspension Clause.252
Boumediene, which contains the Court’s most extensive
discussion of the Suspension Clause to date, supports interpreting
the Clause to protect the writ as it has evolved based on this
original understanding.253 In Boumediene, the Court began by
examining the historical evidence to determine whether the 1789
writ would have extended to the petitioners, alleged enemy
combatants held in U.S. military detention at Guantanamo Bay.254
To resolve this question, the Court examined whether the writ had
historically reached alleged alien enemies in custody abroad.255
After an extensive analysis of both English and Founding-era
precedents, cited by the parties as well as by legal historians as
amici curiae,256 the Court effectively called it a draw, finding that
historical precedents did not resolve the matter.257 Importantly,
the Court said that the absence of precedents did not dictate a
resolution, and “decline[d] . . . to infer too much, one way or the
other, from the lack of historical evidence on point.”258 Although
Boumediene did not expressly state that the Suspension Clause
protected an evolving form of the writ, it emphasized that
251
Id. at 992 (summarizing research by Paul Halliday); id. (“Tying the Suspension
Clause to the Founding makes sense only if one accepts that the result is a
constitutional floor marked by fluid principles, not rigid practices.”); Developments in
the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1263, 1269 (1970) (suggesting
that the Framers “must have . . . underst[ood] habeas corpus as an inherently elastic
concept not bound to its 1789 form” and intended the Suspension Clause “to protect
the product of an evolving judicial process.”); Mark D. Falkoff, Back to Basics: Habeas
Corpus Procedures and Long-Term Executive Detention, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 961, 963
(2009) (“[T]he Framers understood that habeas corpus at its core was a flexible and
evolving remedy.”).
252
See FREEDMAN, supra note 104, at 128.
253
See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
254
See id. at 739.
255
Id.
256
See id. at 746–52; Id. at 746, 748 (discussing amici curiae submissions).
257
Id. at 752.
258
Id. (noting government’s position that lack of “evidence that a court sitting in
England granted habeas relief to an enemy alien detained abroad” favored denying
Suspension Clause protections, and petitioners’ position that “there is no evidence
that a court refused to do so for lack of jurisdiction” favored granting such protections
but refusing to decide the case on this basis).
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“common-law habeas corpus was, above all, an adaptable remedy,”
and “[i]ts precise application and scope changed depending upon
the circumstances.”259 Further, and importantly, Boumediene
emphasized that “[t]he Court has been careful not to foreclose the
possibility that the protections of the Suspension Clause have
expanded along with post–1789 developments that define the
present scope of the writ,”260 and, after finding the body of preratification and Founding era precedents inconclusive, relied on
post-ratification constitutional developments in construing the
Clause’s reach and application.261 These developments included
the Insular Cases and other precedents addressing the
Constitution’s extraterritorial application, which the Court
interpreted in light of the Suspension Clause’s continuing
structural role in checking misuses of executive power and
protecting individual liberty.262 The functional, multi-factored test
the Court adopted in Boumediene to determine the Suspension
Clause’s application to Guantanamo, a territory over which the
U.S. exercised completed control but lacked de jure sovereignty,
was thus informed by constitutional principles articulated and
developed over time263—an interpretative methodology that
supports viewing the Clause as protecting an evolving form of the
habeas writ capable of reviewing new forms and uses of
detention.264
Boumediene, moreover, refused to confine the Suspension
Clause’s scope to the historical record of Founding era habeas
precedents, let alone endorse a methodological approach that
requires searching the record for a precedent addressing the exact
same situation a court is confronting more than two centuries
later. As the Court explained, not only are there “inherent
259

Id. at 779 (citing 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 104, at 131).
Id. at 746.
261
Id. at 755–57, 770–71.
262
Id. at 756–71 (discussing the Insular Cases and other decisions addressing the
Constitution’s extraterritorial application). The Insular Cases refer to a line of cases
decided between 1901 and 1922, in which the Supreme Court addressed the
application of particular constitutional provisions outside the United States, whether
in foreign countries or in the nonstate “territories” of the United States. See Christina
Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality after Boumediene, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 973, 974–75, 975 n.4 (2009).
263
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766 (concluding that the Suspension Clause applied
to the petitioners at Guantanamo based on various factors, including the citizenship
status of the detainee (i.e., whether a U.S. citizen or noncitizen), the circumstances of
his capture and confinement, and the practical obstacles, if any, to the exercise of
habeas jurisdiction).
264
Id. at 796 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10, (1953)).
260
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shortcomings in the historical record,”265 but “the common-law
courts simply may not have confronted cases with close parallels”
to the challenges a court faces today, like the challenge presented
in Boumediene.266
Boumediene thus reaffirms that historical evidence of pre1789 habeas precedents and practice remain relevant to a
Suspension Clause analysis, both for understanding background
principles surrounding the writ and to determine whether this
evidence is alone sufficient to resolve the dispute in favor of the
Suspension Clause based on the absolute irreducible minimum
protected by the 1789 writ, as in St. Cyr. However, Boumediene
also demonstrates that, unless the historical evidence is
sufficiently clear to resolve the question on that basis, history, or
at least a form of historical analysis that combs the historical
record for on-point precedents, is merely a starting point and not
an
end.
As
Gerald
Neuman
has
explained,
“[t]he Suspension Clause, like other constitutional guarantees, is
a part of an evolving constitutional tradition,” and “[i]ts efficacy is
best preserved by a functional approach that can adapt its
operation to surrounding institutional changes.”267 For this
reason, the Suspension Clause should be interpreted not only to
protect the writ that existed in 1789, but also the writ as it has
evolved over time and adapted to changing circumstances to
ensure the Clause continues to both protect individual liberty and
constrain illegal executive action in an increasingly variegated
realm of detentions.
B.

Subsequent History and Practice

In addition to looking broadly at historical understandings of
the writ, courts should ask whether subjecting a particular
restraint to habeas review is consistent with the overall trajectory
of the writ’s history and its use over time by examining postratification developments in addition to pre-ratification
jurisprudence, much as the Court did in Boumediene.
265
Id. at 752 (citing Halliday & White, supra note 247). Moreover, the handful of
published common law habeas cases that were intensely debated by the parties, and
evaluated by the Court, represent only a small fraction of the habeas cases for which
records exist. See HALLIDAY, supra note 76, at 319–22 (referencing the archival
records for nearly 3,000 habeas cases between 1500–1800).
266
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 752. (“[G]iven the unique status of Guantanamo Bay
and the particular dangers of terrorism in the modern age, the common-law courts
simply may not have confronted cases with close parallels to this one.”).
267
Neuman, supra note 87, at 970.
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The Supreme Court has considered subsequent history in
interpreting the Constitution. In District of Columbia v. Heller,268
for example, Justice Scalia said that examining post-ratification
understandings
“is
a
critical
tool
of
constitutional
269
interpretation,”
and shifted liberally between pre- and postratification history in interpreting the Second Amendment to
protect an individual right to bear arms.270
The Court has also frequently looked to post-founding
government practice.271 The basis for relying on such practice is
most closely associated with Justice Frankfurter’s concurring
opinion in The Steel Seizure case, which maintains that in
interpreting the words of the Constitution’s text, consideration
should be given to “the gloss which life has written upon them.”272
More recently, in NLRB v. Noel Canning,273 the Court leaned
heavily on this historical gloss in interpreting the scope of the
President’s authority to make recess appointments.274 The
political branches themselves, along with academic commentators,
have likewise placed considerable emphasis on past government
practice.275 This practice has been most important in resolving
disputes over the Constitution’s separation of powers.276 And,
while the primary focus has been on past executive branch
practice, past judicial practice also provides a basis for historical
268

554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Id. at 605.
270
See id. at 601–02, 605–19 ; see also Darryl A.H. Miller, Text History, and
Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us about the Second, 122 YALE
L.J. 852, 909 (2013) (noting that Heller moved between “Postratification Commentary
by the likes of St. George Tucker and Joseph Story, Pre-Civil War Case Law (including
from states that did not exist in 1791), Post-Civil War Legislation, and Post-Civil War
Commentators”).
271
See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Madisonian
Liquidation, and the Originalism Debate, 106 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2020).
272
Youngstown v. Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
273
573 U.S. 513 (2014).
274
Id. at 526 (underscoring the importance of historical practice in interpreting
the Recess Clause); id. at 529 (detailing a relatively consistent and common practice
of intrasession recess appointments during the prior seventy-five years).
275
See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 271, at 3. See also, e.g., Samuel Issacheroff &
Trevor Morrison, Constitution by Convention, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1913, 1915−16
(2020); Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595,
1672−73 (2014); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the
Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 413 (2012). Scholars have also discussed
the related, but ultimately distinct, concept of “liquidation.” See, e.g., William Baude,
Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 63−64 (2019) (comparing the
interpretive methodology of “historical gloss” with that of “liquidation”).
276
See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 271, at 4.
269
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gloss.277 Further, in evaluating historical practice, greater weight
is given to actual behavior, rather than stated rationales.278
Because Thuraissigiam addressed the Suspension Clause’s
application based solely on the habeas writ that existed in 1789, it
did not consider the gloss that history and, more specifically past
judicial practice, has placed on the Suspension Clause. As noted
earlier, when Thuraissigiam analyzed the finality era cases, it
reviewed them to determine whether they established binding
precedent based on the Suspension Clause’s application to the
challenges to immigration removal in those cases, and concluded
they did not because they rested ultimately on interpretation of
the habeas statute rather than the Suspension Clause.279
Thuraissigiam did not, however, consider the related but
ultimately distinct question of whether—and how—this extensive
body of past judicial practice, which occurred over a 60-plus-yearperiod, might nonetheless inform current interpretations of the
Suspension Clause based on evolving understandings and uses of
the writ. Here, it is noteworthy that, throughout the finality era,
the Court never questioned whether the nature and goal of the
restraint itself—detention for purpose of removal from the
country—placed the restraint outside the “in custody”
requirement for habeas,280 even though there were, as the
Thuraissigiam Court recognized, no pre-ratification examples of
the writ’s use to challenge immigration decisions. Instead, the
only question was whether Congress had precluded review over
the particular claims raised by the petitioners in these cases.281
The finality era cases thus demonstrate a consistent and historical
practice by the judiciary of treating immigration removal as
277

Id. at 18.
Id.
279
See supra text accompanying notes 112–13; Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. 1959,
1976 (2020) (“[T]he ‘finality era’ cases . . . were based not on the Suspension Clause
but on the habeas statute and the immigration laws then in force.”).
280
See also Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1976. Congress expanded the
statutory basis for habeas jurisdiction after 1789, most notably in 1867, when it
amended the federal habeas statute to cover persons in custody “in violation of the
Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States,” thus extending the statute
to persons in state custody. See Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 1867, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. But
nothing about the nature of the statute’s “in custody” requirement itself—in terms of
the manner or purpose of the restraint—has changed since the Suspension Clause
was adopted. Congress’s near-contemporaneous enactment of the Judiciary Act of
1789, for example, refers only to those “in custody” in describing judges’ power to issue
habeas writs, and Congress has not altered or qualified the “in custody” language itself
since then. See First Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (1789).
281
See Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1963.
278
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satisfying the “in custody” requirement for habeas—a longtime
and consistent use of the writ that the Suspension Clause should
be understood to protect, even if a particular claim, such as the
specific challenge to expedited removal by a person in
Thuraissigiam’s circumstances, might be found to fall outside its
reach.
C.

The Risk of Government Circumvention

The risk that the government could circumvent the
protections provided by habeas corpus provides another reason to
interpret the Suspension Clause as protecting an evolving habeas
privilege rather than confining the analysis to the type of
narrow—and potentially distorting—historical inquiry employed
in Thuraissigiam. The Supreme Court has emphasized the
Suspension Clause’s dual role both as a guarantee of individual
liberty and as a check on arbitrary action by the Executive, by
ensuring the Executive adheres to applicable legal constraints.282
This role is implicated not only when the state detains for the
purpose of continued imprisonment, but also when it does so in
order to forcibly transfer a person from the country. Forcible
transfers in such circumstances carry significant risks for both
personal liberty and for arbitrary executive action, especially
where the executive defies the legal restraints the legislature has
placed on it, such as in the asylum context, where statutes prohibit
transfers to a country where there is a risk of torture, persecution,
or other mistreatment. 283 If read broadly, Thuraissigiam could
invite such circumvention by allowing the government to evade
the Suspension Clause by assigning a purpose to a given custodial
restraint other than that of continued imprisonment.
The government should not have the power to thwart the
purpose of the Suspension Clause by manipulating factors entirely
within its control.
In Boumediene, that factor was the
government’s decision about where to detain a person.284 As
Justice Kennedy explained in Boumediene, to give “the political
branches . . . the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will”

282

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008) (“Security subsists, too, in
fidelity to freedom’s first principles. Chief among these are freedom from arbitrary
and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the
separation of powers. It is from these principles that the judicial authority to consider
petitions for habeas corpus relief derives.”).
283
See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(i) (2009); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) (2014).
284
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765.
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based on where it chooses to confine an individual would
undermine the Constitution’s inclusion of the habeas guarantee as
“an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separation of
powers.” 285
This anti-circumvention principle has also informed the
Court’s treatment of other constitutional provisions, including
where the government engages in conduct that would not have
been covered by a constitutional provision in 1789. In interpreting
the Constitution’s Taking Clause, for example, the Court has held
that the Clause can encompass regulations when they eliminate
economic value, even though the original Takings Clause, almost
certainly, prevented only the condemnation of property.286 To
quote Justice Scalia, “if the protection against physical
appropriations of private property [is] to be meaningfully enforced,
the government’s power to redefine the range of interests included
in the ownership of property [must] necessarily [be] constrained
by constitutional limits.”287
The risk of government circumvention provides another
reason to interpret the Suspension Clause to protect evolving
restraints on liberty, especially given the expansion of new forms
of detention that did not exist in 1789 and the degree to which the
government has control over factors like the location and purpose
of a person’s detention, as Boumediene and Thuraissigiam,
respectively, illustrate.

285
Id.; see also id. at 765−66 (“The test for determining the scope of [the
Suspension Clause] must not be subject to manipulation by those whose power it is
designed to restrain.”); see also Eric M. Freedman, Habeas Corpus in Three
Dimensions, Dimension III: Habeas Corpus as an Instrument of Checks and Balances,
8 NE. U. L.J. 251, 256−57 (2016) (discussing Boumediene’s importance in recognizing
“habeas corpus as an instrument for the enforcement of checks and balances”).
286
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014–16 (1992).
287
Id. at 1014; see also William Michael Traynor, The Original Understandings of
the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 803–05 (1995)
(noting that “[i]n fashioning a modern takings jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
essentially ignored the original understanding of the Takings Clause” and instead
reasoned by analogy and characterized regulatory takings as functional equivalents
to condemnation); Eric R. Claeys, Takings and Private Property on the Rehnquist
Court, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 187, 206 (2006) (discussing Lucas’s construction of a
“meaningful limitation” on regulatory takings in the absence of direct historical
evidence).
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D. The Use of Evolving Standards to Interpret Related
Constitutional Protections
The Court’s interpretation of other provisions in the
Constitution, especially those that serve to protect individual
liberty and personal security, such as the Due Process Clause, the
Eighth Amendment, and the Fourth Amendment, provides further
support for interpreting the Suspension Clause as protecting more
than the specific uses of habeas in 1789. While the doctrinal
approaches to these provisions vary, they all, to one extent or
another, incorporate evolving standards rather than restricting
the analysis to the legal landscape at the Founding.288
Interpreting the Suspension Clause in this manner would not only
be more faithful to its history and purpose, as described above, but
would also promote greater methodological congruence across
areas of constitutional interpretation.
The Court, for example, has looked to evolving standards in
interpreting the liberty protected under the Due Process Clause.
In Obergefell v. Hodges,289 in recognizing a right to same sex
marriage, the Court explained that substantive due process may
evolve because of changing societal views about what constitutes
“liberty” under the Clause, and that judges may accordingly
recognize new liberty rights based on their “reasoned judgment.”290
The Court explained that while “[h]istory and tradition guide and
discipline th[e] inquiry” to determine which liberty interests are
so fundamental as to be accorded protections under the Due
Process Clause, they “do not set its outer boundaries.”291 While the
Court has previously staked out sharply diverging positions on
whether, and the degree to which, evolving standards should
inform interpretations of the Due Process Clause,292 it has
generally resisted limiting the liberty protected by the Clause
strictly to pre-ratification understandings or precedents.293
288

See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 663–64 (2015); Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 561–63 (2005); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
289
576 U.S. 644.
290
Id. at 663–64.
291
Id.
292
See Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1543,
1545 (2008) (noting the Court’s failure to entrench “due process traditionalism” and
the trend of relying on “evolving judgments, rather than long-standing practices”); see
also Daniel O’Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63,
82–83 (2006) (outlining the Supreme Court’s competing theories of substantive due
process).
293
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–72 (2003) (placing greater
reliance on “laws and traditions [of] the past half century” in evaluating the liberty
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The Court has likewise relied on evolving norms in construing
the Eighth Amendment. As the Court explained in Roper v.
Simmons,294 the prohibition against “cruel and unusual
punishments” must be interpreted in light of “ ‘the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’
to determine which punishments are so disproportionate as to be
cruel and unusual.”295 In applying this test, the Court has
considered “objective criteria” such “as legislative enactments,
patterns of jury decision making, and international opinion” to
determine “contemporary values,”296 and also relied on “the
exercise of its own independent judgment.”297 The Court had
previously interpreted the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and
unusual” punishment as specifically limited to the infliction of
torture and other barbaric methods of punishment employed at
the Founding.298 The Court later shifted its approach, explaining
that the Eighth Amendment should not be restricted to the forms
of punishment that existed in 1789 but rather should be broader
in scope,299 expressly rejecting pre-ratification conceptions of
cruelty as the Eighth Amendment’s outer limit and incorporating
a proportionality analysis.300 It has also explained that the Eighth
Amendment’s “scope is not static” and interpreted the Amendment
based on its purpose.301
In the Fourth Amendment context, the Court has resisted
limiting constitutional protections only to those searches and
seizures known in 1789 and instead interpreted the Fourth

protected by the Due Process Clause); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (reaffirming the central holding of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), not merely based on precedent but also on reasoned judgment); see also Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts must consult
tradition but embracing the notion of a living tradition that is “built upon postulates
of respect for . . . the individual”).
294
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
295
Id. at 560–61(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958); accord Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002).
296
Roper, 543 U.S. at 561–63; see also Mary Sigler, The Political Morality of the
Eighth Amendment, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 403, 404–05 (2011) (discussing the
Supreme Court’s application of the “evolving standards” of decency test).
297
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010).
298
See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) (construing the Eighth
Amendment to prohibit “punishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line of
unnecessary cruelty”); Sigler, supra note 296, at 407.
299
See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372–73 (1910); Sigler, supra note
296, at 407–08.
300
See Sigler, supra note 296, at 407–08.
301
See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958).
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Amendment based on changing understandings of privacy and
security from arbitrary governmental interference.302 As Justice
Brandeis famously noted in his dissent in Olmstead v. United
States,303 the Fourth Amendment must keep pace to account for
the “[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy
[that] have become available to the government” since the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.304 The Court’s subsequent and seminal
shift of Fourth Amendment doctrine beginning in Katz v. United
States,305 from the physical trespass of an individual’s property to
their reasonable expectation of privacy,306 demonstrates how the
Court has sought to prevent an erosion of the constitutional norm
through adaptation. The Court’s interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment has continued to evolve in response to the
increasingly powerful and sophisticated tools available to the
government.
In Kyllo v. United States,307 Justice Scalia
emphasized the need to safeguard the home in the face of novel
encroachments made possible by modern technology—such as the
use of thermal-imaging technology to gather information about a
home’s interior—to protect the degree of privacy that existed when
the Fourth Amendment was adopted.308 Additionally, two of the
Court’s most significant recent Fourth Amendment decisions—
Riley v. California309 and Carpenter v. United States310—both
construed the Fourth Amendment to keep pace with technological
change: in Riley, by recognizing that the vast amount of personal
information stored on cell phones requires police officers to obtain
a warrant to search their contents when making an arrest,311 and
in Carpenter, by recognizing that the “seismic shifts in digital
technology” that enable tracking a person’s movement over time
through cell phone location data provide “an intimate window into

302
See, e.g., Kathryn R. Urbonya, Fourth Amendment Federalism? The Court’s
Vacillating Mistrust and Trust of State Search and Seizure Laws, 35 SETON HALL L.
REV. 911, 916–17 (2005).
303
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
304
Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
305
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
306
Id. at 351; Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (advocating the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test). After Katz, the Court adopted Justice Harlan’s
reasonable expectation of privacy test. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
307
533 U.S. 27, 33–35 (2001).
308
Id.
309
573 U.S. 373, 396 (2014).
310
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
311
Riley, 573 U.S. at 396–97.
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[that] person’s life”312 and thus require that the government obtain
a warrant to access this information.313 As Chief Justice Roberts
explained, the Court must avoid a purely “ ‘mechanical
interpretation’ of the Fourth Amendment” that limits its ability to
protect privacy and personal security in the face of the expanded
surveillance powers that new technologies make possible.314
Similar rationales support interpreting the Suspension
Clause in light of evolving understandings to encompass physical
restraints on liberty that may not have existed at the Founding.
Just as the Eighth Amendment does not define what punishments
are “cruel and unusual,” or the Fourth Amendment define a
“search,” the Suspension Clause does not specify the scope of the
habeas privilege it guarantees. But limiting the Suspension
Clause only to specific categories of custody that existed in 1789
would result in the type of circumscribed and mechanical inquiry
that undermines the Suspension Clause’s ability to achieve its
dual purposes of protecting liberty and preserving the separation
of powers by providing a judicial restraint on unlawful action by
the executive.
E.

The Suspension Clause and Forcible Transfers

The Suspension Clause’s application to forcible transfers to
another country—the question surfaced by Thuraissigiam—
suggests the value of interpreting the Clause to include evolving
uses and understandings of the habeas writ, rather than confining
the inquiry solely to the writ that existed in 1789. It also provides
a way to prevent placing unfounded restrictions on the Suspension
Clause’s habeas guarantee based on the nature or purpose of the
custodial restraint, which risks confining the Suspension Clause
too narrowly, given the multitude of ways the government can
impose restraints on personal liberty.
In determining the type of restraints the Suspension Clause
protects, courts could look, for example, to international or foreign
court decisions defining the content of judicially protected liberty
rights under international law.315 They could also look to
legislative developments, both at the federal and state level, as
well as prior judicial practice and interpretation.

312
313
314
315

138 S. Ct. at 2217, 2219.
See id. at 2221.
Id. at 2214 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001)).
See infra text accompanying note 329.
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In his dissent in St. Cyr, Justice Scalia criticized the notion
that the scope of the Suspension Clause could evolve over time,
creating what he termed a “one-way ratchet” by which any
congressional expansion to the federal habeas statute would
henceforth be “enshrine[d] in the Constitution.”316 But while
Congress might expand the writ’s scope, as it has done on multiple
occasions,317 not all those expansions would necessarily be
constitutionalized. Constitutional habeas would instead include
the 1789 baseline minimum, together with any additional
protections warranted by the writ’s history, purpose, and the
nature of the restraint itself. Statutory modifications might
provide evidence that society deems a particular restraint on
liberty sufficiently severe to justify constitutional protection, but
it would not itself be dispositive. Congress would also remain free
to modify the writ, even in situations where the Suspension Clause
applied (or arguably applied), as long as it provided an adequate
and effective substitute, as Congress has previously done in
altering federal post-conviction review procedures.318
Constitutional interpretation based on evolving standards has
been subject to criticism. In particular, the Court’s approach to
the Eighth Amendment has been attacked both for an
indeterminacy that allows justices to enact their particular policy
preferences or general sense of the public mood319 and for adopting
a majoritarian test in which “evolving standards” are based partly
on objective and quantifiable metrics, such as the number of states
with a particular punishment practice, that undercuts the
amendment’s role as “a countermajoritarian check.”320 While
316

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 341–42 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 773–74 (2008) (discussing expansions
to the federal habeas statute).
318
See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223–24 (1952) (upholding
statutory modification that required prisoner to bring collateral challenge in the
sentencing court, rather than in the district of confinement, as required under
traditional habeas practice); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 374–78 (1977)
(upholding new collateral process in the D.C. Superior Court for the pre-existing
habeas corpus procedure in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia); cf.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 792 (finding that Congress had failed to provide an adequate
and effective substitute when it eliminated habeas jurisdiction over petitions filed by
alleged enemy combatants at Guantanamo and explaining that if Congress had
provided such a substitute, the alternative procedures could have satisfied the
Suspension Clause).
319
See, e.g., Sigler, supra note 296, at 405.
320
See, e.g., Pamela A. Wilkins, Rethinking Categorial Prohibitions on Capital
Punishment: How the Current Test Fails Mentally Ill Offenders and What to Do About
it, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 423, 459 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).
317
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relevant, these criticisms have less validity against an evolving
approach to the Suspension Clause.
Unlike the Eighth
Amendment or other individual rights provisions that are
interpreted based on evolving understandings, the Suspension
Clause does not dictate a substantive standard, rule, or outcome;
rather, it guarantees a judicial forum for evaluating the legality of
a particular restriction on personal liberty against an external
standard, whether in a statute or other constitutional provision.321
Because the Suspension Clause provides for judicial review,
applying a dynamic and fluid approach to the Suspension Clause
does not present the same concerns about judicial overreach as
critics might argue such an approach presents when interpreting
the Constitution’s other individual rights guarantees. Merely
because a petitioner can seek habeas review of their detention does
not mean they will prevail. Further, as discussed more fully
above, the habeas writ that the Suspension Clause protects is, by
nature, adaptable and evolving, and has traditionally been
interpreted and applied by judges based on that understanding.322
By contrast, limiting the Suspension Clause to habeas’s specific
uses in 1789 demonstrates a striking lack of fidelity to that
tradition.
The Court has already indicated both the importance and
viability of a flexible approach in its treatment of the “in custody”
requirement, traditionally understood as a sine qua non for the
exercise of habeas jurisdiction. Beginning in the 1960s, the
Supreme Court construed the “in custody” provision of the federal
habeas statute not to require actual physical detention. In Jones
v. Cunningham,323 for example, the Court construed the definition
of “in custody” to include parole.324 In subsequent decisions, the
Court continued to interpret the in custody requirement broadly,
finding that it includes prisoners serving consecutive sentences,325
prisoners whose sentences had expired but who continued to suffer
collateral consequences from their allegedly unlawful
conviction,326 and prisoners released on their personal
321

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 744.
See supra Part IV.A.
323
371 U.S. 236 (1963).
324
Id. at 243.
325
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 67 (1968) (prisoner serving consecutive sentences
is still in custody if any consecutive sentence he is scheduled to serve was imposed in
violation of his constitutional rights).
326
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 239–40 (1968) (individual remains in
custody for habeas purposes even though he has been released pending appeal).
322
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recognizance.327 These interpretations of the habeas statute
recognize that habeas should extend to significant restraints on
liberty to fulfill the writ’s purpose, even if the particular restraints
themselves did not exist in 1789. They also suggest the Court’s
understanding of the need to reason from the broader principles
and purposes that underlie the habeas writ. As the Jones Court
explained, “there are other restraints on a man’s liberty [beyond
incarceration], restraints not shared by the public generally,
which have been thought sufficient in the English-speaking world
to support the issuance of habeas corpus.”328
Despite its
subsequent narrowing of the “in custody” requirement,329 the
Court has continued to recognize that habeas “is not now and
never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy,”330 and that
its overarching purpose of protecting individuals against wrongful
restraints on their freedom should inform its reach and scope.331
While the Court’s treatment of the in custody requirement has
been based on the habeas statute, it should also inform
interpretation of the Suspension Clause because it demonstrates
a recognition of the evolving uses of habeas together with an
understanding of how various restraints short of incarceration can
nonetheless jeopardize individual liberty and lead to misuses of
government power.
Government restraints on liberty have not only expanded over
time but will continue to grow.332 Serving a sentence for a criminal
327
Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 349 (1973) (An individual released
on his personal recognizance remains in custody for purposes of a habeas challenge.).
328
Jones, 371 U.S. at 240.
329
See, e.g., Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 376 (1989) (holding that
federal prisoner cannot challenge expired sentence that is being used to enhance the
length of a current sentence); Lackawanna Cty. Dist. Att’y v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 396
(2001) (holding same for state prisoner); see also Garrett Ordower, Comment, Gone,
But Not Forgotten: Habeas Corpus for Necessary Predicate Offenses, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
1837, 1846–50 (2009) (discussing narrowing of the “in custody” requirement).
330
Jones, 371 U.S. at 243. The Supreme Court most recently cited this language
from Jones with approval in Boumediene v. Bush. See 553 U.S. 723, 779–80 (2008).
331
See Wendy R. Calaway, Sex Offenders, Custody and Habeas, 92 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 755, 760–68 (2018) (noting that the Supreme Court and lower courts have taken
a broad view of the habeas statute’s “in custody” requirement and have found the
requirement satisfied based on “far less serious infringements of a person’s liberty”
than incarceration).
332
See Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, NonCustodial Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 328–29 (2014) (noting the
“proliferation” of “non-custodial pre-crime restraints” based on an assessment that an
individual is likely to commit a future bad act, including travel restrictions in the form
of a “No-Fly List” as well as residential, employment, and other restrictions imposed
on convicted sex offenders).
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conviction is merely one of a multiplying number of ways the state
can restrain a person’s freedom. Sex offenders, for example, today
face myriad registration requirements and restrictions that limit
where they can live, work, and carry on other basic daily
activities.333 Governments also rely increasingly on electronic
monitoring systems to track an offender’s location, and have a
growing capability to monitor their conduct in real-time, including
through the use of artificial intelligence.334 As states becomes
more adept at using the increasingly sophisticated means of
technology at their disposal, they may rely less on blunter and
more costly methods of restricting liberty like incarceration. They
will also possess a greater ability and incentive to characterize the
nature and purpose of the restraint in a way that could avoid
triggering habeas jurisdiction, thus raising the risk of
circumvention.
The use of counter-terrorism “control orders” by the United
Kingdom provides an instructive example of the types of
mechanisms a state may employ to restrict liberty and why the
Suspension Clause should be interpreted to protect evolving uses
of the writ. Since the early 2000s, the U.K. Parliament has
enacted various measures, often grouped under the label of
“control orders,” that restrict the liberty of terrorism suspects
without incarceration.335 Other countries, including Australia and
Canada, have adopted similar measures.336 The reliance on control
orders increased after the European Court of Human Rights
sustained a challenge to the statutory scheme of indefinite
detention in the United Kingdom. The European Court ruled that
the legislation applied exclusively to noncitizens, thus violating
333

See Mirko Bagaric et al., Introducing Disruptive Technology to Criminal
Sanctions: Punishment by Computer Monitoring to Enhance Sentencing Fairness and
Efficiency, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 1227, 1272–73 (2019).
334
See Calaway, supra note 331, at 792. Most courts, however, have said that such
individuals, once their prison sentence has expired, are no longer in custody for
purposes of habeas review. Id. at 768 (“Despite the [Supreme Court’s] expansive
position taken with regard to the application of the custody requirement, courts have
almost universally refused to extend the custody requirement to those under a sex
offender registration.”).
335
See, e.g., Helen Fenwick & Gavin Phillipson, Covert Derogations and the
Judicial Deference: Redefining Liberty and Due Process Rights in Counterterrorism
Law and Beyond, 56 MCGILL L.J. 863, 873−74 (2011).
336
See, e.g., Clive Walker, The Reshaping of Control Orders in the United
Kingdom: Time for a Fairer Go, Australia!, 37 MELBOURNE UNIV. L. REV. 143, 175−76
(2013) (comparing U.K. and Australian control orders); Arturo J. Carrillo, The Price
of Prevention: Anti-Terrorism Pre-Crime Measures and International Human Rights
Law, 60 VA. J. INT’L L. 571, 590−91 (2020).
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the principle of non-discrimination, and failed to consider other,
more proportionate and non-arbitrary means.337 U.K. courts have
subsequently evaluated whether control orders violate the right to
liberty under article 5 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.338 They have rejected the notion that the right to liberty is
limited to imprisonment and found that a number of restraints
short of imprisonment, including home confinement for a certain
number of hours per day, spot searches of residences, and
restricting movement to certain areas, can violate the right to
liberty.339 Courts have also upheld other restrictions, such as
shorter periods of home confinement and the use of electronic
tagging.340 In 2011, Parliament replaced control orders with the
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act, which
authorizes various preventive measures that seek to limit the
intrusion into the daily lives of suspects,341 but which critics have
characterized as “control orders lite.”342 The U.K. experience with
control orders not only suggests the variety of ways that
governments may restrict liberty short of imprisonment, but also
demonstrates a more nuanced approach to liberty rights than the
sharp division between continued incarceration and other types of
restraints on liberty that the Supreme Court created in
Thuraissigiam.
Not all restraints would trigger habeas jurisdiction, and
difficult questions will arise over whether a particular restraint is
sufficient to trigger such jurisdiction. Recent state-mandated
“stay-at-home” orders intended to combat the COVID-19
pandemic, which restrict freedom of movement, public gatherings,
commercial activities, and various other aspects of daily life, offer

337

A. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/05, ¶ 252 (Feb. 19, 2009).
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 5, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
339
See Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. JJ [2007] UKHL 45, [2008] 1 AC 385
(HL) 15–16, 42; see also AP v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2009] EWCA (Civ)
731 [57] (Carnwath, L.J. dissenting) (requiring a detainee to relocate from London,
and thus cutting off the detainee’s access to friends and family, violated the European
Convention on Human Rights). The U.K. House of Lords has, however, ruled that
control orders that employ less onerous curfews and other measures such as electronic
tagging did not breach article 5. See Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t v. MB and AF [2007]
UKHL 46, [2008] 1 AC 440 (HL) 11, 38.
340
See Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t v. MB and AF [2007] UKHL 46, [2008] 1 AC
440 (HL) 7.
341
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, c. 23, § 2 sch. 1
(U.K.).
342
Walker, supra note 336, at 153.
338
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one example,343 especially when accompanied by extensive
government surveillance,344 as has occurred in some countries.345
These orders, predicated on a state’s long established use of its
police powers to address public health threats,346 have given rise
to various constitutional challenges and prompted resistance from
the Supreme Court, at least to the extent the orders impermissibly
burden First Amendment-protected religious freedoms.347 The
nature of these restraints on liberty, which do not involve the
exercise of any physical custody, and which have been subject to
legal challenge by other means, like civil actions for equitable
relief and/or damages, has obviated any need to consider whether
a particular public health restraint might be sufficient to trigger
habeas jurisdiction.348 But these restraints still suggest the value
343
See, e.g., Seawright v. Bd. of Elections in City of N.Y., 35 N.Y.3d 227, 239–40 (2020)
(discussing New York’s stay-at-home order); Governor Whitmer Extends Stay Home, Stay
Safe Order, Reopens Manufacturing as Part of Her MI Safe Start Plan, MICHIGAN.GOV (May
7, 2020), https://www.michigan.gov/leo/News/2020/05/07/governor-whitmer-extends-stayhome-stay-safe-order-reopens-manufacturing-as-part-of-her-mi-safe-sta
[https://perma.cc/E554-78CX] (imposing a stay-at-home order in Michigan); Katherine
Florey, COVID-19 and Domestic Travel Restrictions, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. REFLECTION
1, 7–8 (2020) (discussing COVID-19 restrictions on movement both within and between
states); Lindsey F. Wiley & Stephen I. Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the Courts:
The Case Against “Suspending” Judicial Review, 133 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 186–87 (2020).
344
See Barry Friedman & Robin Tholin, Policing the Pandemic, UNIV. CHI. L. REV.
ONLINE 79, 82–83 (2020) (discussing the potential threat posed by government
surveillance to enforce pandemic-related restrictions).
345
See Jacques deLisle & Shen Kui, Lessons from China’s Response to COVID-19:
Shortcomings, Successes, and Prospects for Reform in the Chinese Regulatory State,
16 U. PENN. ASIAN L. REV. 66, 131 (2020) (noting China’s aggressive use of tracking
and tracing to address COVID-19).
346
See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (holding that a state has
broad authority to impose reasonable public health and safety measures to address
communicable diseases). In Jacobson, the Court held a state vaccination mandate was
a proper exercise of its police powers. Id. at 26.
347
See, e.g., Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 St. Ct. 63, 67–68
(Nov. 25, 2020) (finding that New York’s emergency restrictions on attendance at
religious services impermissibly burden Free Exercise Clause rights); see also id. 69
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Government is not free to disregard the First Amendment
in times of crisis. At a minimum, that Amendment prohibits government officials from
treating religious exercises worse than comparable secular activities, unless they are
pursuing a compelling interest and using the least restrictive means available.”).
Previously, the Court had narrowly voted to uphold California’s restriction on public
gatherings against a Free Exercise Clause challenge to combat it. See South Bay
United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020).
348
See, e.g., Ex Baptist Church v. Kelly, 457 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1075 (D. Kan. 2020)
(action by two churches against state official seeking to enjoin COVID-19 related
capacity restrictions on religious worship). For recent prior civil actions challenging
public health restrictions on liberty, see, for example, Hickox v. Christie, 205 F. Supp.
3d 579, 585–88 (D.N.J. 2016) (allowing some claims of nurse challenging 80-hour state
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of articulating an evolving conception of the writ secured by the
Suspension Clause for at least two reasons, each of which has
broader potential applications.
First, habeas has historically provided a means of challenging
non-carceral restraints like quarantines.349 Thus, it is certainly
conceivable that the government’s use of quarantine or other
public health measures that significantly restrict movement, such
as extended stay-at-home orders, could potentially give rise to a
habeas challenge today, particularly given the flexibility with
which courts have previously interpreted the “in custody”
requirement to effectuate the writ’s purpose.350 And second, the
Suspension Clause remains an important constitutional safeguard
if a government restriction on liberty were to be accompanied by a
provision seeking to preclude any judicial challenge to its legality,
including through an action for declaratory and injunctive relief.
This, after all, is precisely what has occurred in both the
immigration and military detention settings, where Congress
sought to restrict judicial review through broadly worded language
that targets not only habeas but also any civil action.351
In short, the potentially difficult line-drawing problems in
determining whether the Suspension Clause encompasses a
quarantine to proceed under federal civil rights statute). Habeas litigation
surrounding COVID-19 has instead focused on claims by current prisoners seeking
release based on the health and safety risks posed by the pandemic in carceral
settings. See, e.g., Houston v. Davis, No. 3:18-CV-03199-G, 2020 WL 3036616, at *1–
2 (N.D. Tex. June 5, 2020) (denying request for release on bail pending resolution of
habeas petition due to extraordinary circumstances); Jovel v. Decker, No. 20 Civ. 208,
2020 WL 1467397, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2020) (ordering release pending removal
to individual in immigration detention based on extraordinary circumstances).
349
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Siegel v. Shinnick, 219 F. Supp. 789, 790–91
(E.D.N.Y. 1963) (habeas petition filed by daughter seeking mother’s release from a
federal quarantine facility where she was being held on suspicion that she was
capable of transmitting smallpox); Wendy E. Parmet, Quarantining the Law of
Quarantine: Why Quarantine Law Does Not Reflect Contemporary Constitutional Law,
9 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 1, 19 (2018) (“Most of what we know about the law
of quarantine comes from reviews of habeas corpus petitions, which formed the
traditional path by which individuals challenged quarantines.”); see also Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing quarantine as
one of the limited instances in which a state may incapacitate an individual without
charge and without a valid suspension of the writ).
350
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 239–240 (1963).
351
See Military Commissions Act of 2006, § 7, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006) (for noncitizens detained by the military as enemy combatants, eliminating
jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions and over “any other action,” except as
provided for in the statute); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) (for noncitizens subject to expedited
removal, eliminating jurisdiction over any action except for limited jurisdiction in
habeas corpus).
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particular restraint that did not exist in 1789 does not warrant
limiting the Clause to direct physical custody for the purpose of
continued imprisonment. Instead, the Suspension Clause should
be understood as capable of encompassing other restraints based
on a determination not only of the writ’s history, but also of the
writ’s purpose, its usage over time, and evolving standards, much
as the Court has treated other constitutional provisions designed
to restrict government infringements on liberty, personal security,
and privacy
F.

Possible Alternative Bases for Judicial Review

Scholars have previously suggested other constitutional bases
than the Suspension Clause for guaranteeing review over
immigration removal decisions and other administrative
actions.352 Daniel Meltzer, for example, articulated why Article III
might serve as a superior basis for judicial review over
immigration matters than the Suspension Clause because it would
ensure review even where noncitizens might otherwise fall outside
the reach of habeas, including where they were never in custody,
such as for challenges to visa denials.353 Richard Fallon has
similarly argued in favor of rooting review of administrative
enforcement of immigration law in the Due Process Clause and
Article III.354
In Thuraissigiam, the Court addressed whether the Due
Process Clause, rather than the Suspension Clause, might provide
the constitutional basis for judicial review of expedited removal
procedures.355 It concluded that the Due Process Clause did not
provide a basis for Thuraissigiam to challenge the expedited
removal procedures related to his removal because he could be
assimilated to a person stopped at the border, given how close to
the border he was seized, and therefore was entitled only to the

352

See, e.g., Daniel Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86
GEO. L.J. 2537, 2570 (1998) (arguing that Article III provides an important constraint
on Congress’s power to restrict judicial review); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Applying the
Suspension Clause to Immigration Cases, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1068, 1971 (1998)
(arguing in favor of the Due Process Clause and Article III as bases for guaranteeing
judicial review of administrative enforcement of immigration laws).
353
See Meltzer, supra note 352, at 2573.
354
See Fallon, supra note 352, at 1079 (explaining how broadening this focus
beyond the Suspension Clause would result in greater coherence with other bodies of
law).
355
Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1981–83 (2020).
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procedures Congress had provided him.356 Thuraissigiam thus
necessarily left open the possibility that the Due Process Clause
might provide a basis for judicial review of immigration removal
procedures in other cases, where the Due Process Clause was
deemed to apply to the particular challenge in question, such as
cases involving the removal of individuals seized further inside the
United States or who had been in the country for a longer period
of time.
The primary rationale for grounding the right in the Due
Process Clause is that certain deprivations of liberty are so
significant that they require at least some judicial examination for
them to be upheld. Immigration removal should be a fertile
ground for such a theory. The Court has previously compared
deportation to banishment in its severity.357 The removal of
asylum seekers and others fleeing persecution in their home
countries also risks grave and potentially life-threatening
consequences.
The liberty interests alone should thus be
sufficiently robust to require judicial examination.
But shifting the court-reviewing function of physical
restraints from the habeas guarantee, where it has traditionally
resided, to due process, could weaken this historic foundation for
judicial review of immigration removal. Further, it could shift the
focus to the rights the particular noncitizen is deemed to possess,
which Thuraissigiam suggests might vary based on their
connection to the United States, rather than the legality of the
custodian’s actions.358 Since Thuraissigiam had invoked the Due
Process Clause solely as a merits claim—a claim that the Court
would reach only if it first found jurisdiction based on the
Suspension Clause—the Court should not have decided this
issue.359 Viewed in that light, the Court’s discussion of the Due
Process Clause could be viewed as a cynical attempt to weaken the
rights of asylum seekers, and potentially other noncitizens, rather
356
Id. at 1982 (noting that such noncitizens have not traditionally enjoyed any
due process protections beyond what Congress has provided with respect to their
removal from the country). As noted above, the Court decided this question even
though Thuraissigam had not made this argument but instead maintained that the
sole basis for jurisdiction was under the Suspension Clause. See supra note 67 and
accompanying text.
357
See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945); see also Delgadillo v.
Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947).
358
See Thuraissigiam IV, 140 S. Ct. at 1963–64.
359
See id. at 2011 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining that, in addressing the
Due Process Clause, “the Court opines on a matter neither necessary to its holding
nor seriously in dispute below”).
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than as a genuine engagement with this alternative ground for
judicial review under the Constitution. Limits on habeas review,
like those imposed in Thuraissigiam, ought not be justified by a
claim that due process review is still available when the Court is
also attacking due process in the very same decision.360
Thuraissigiam, moreover, risks conflating the respective
purposes of habeas corpus and due process. While closely related
and often reinforcing,361 habeas and due process are ultimately
distinct protections.362 Due process is commonly divided into two
components: procedural and substantive. Procedural due process
demands that the procedures employed when depriving a person
of liberty are adequate—with the adequacy varying based on the
relative strength of the interests and a cost-benefit analysis that
weighs the administrative burden of providing more safeguards
and the additional value of such safeguards in reducing erroneous
deprivations of liberty.363 Substantive due process prohibits a
narrow band of liberty deprivations no matter how fair or robust
the procedures.364 Together, they provide a standard to examine
360

See id. at 1982.
See Joshua A. Geltzer, Of Suspension, Due Process, and Guantanamo: The
Reach of the Fifth Amendment after Boumediene and the Relationship Between
Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 719, 757–58 (2012) (discussing
the close relationship between the Due Process Clause and the Suspension Clause).
362
See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 98 CORNELL L.
REV. 47, 50–51, 57 (2012).
363
See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (“[I]dentification of the
specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct
factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.”).
364
Garrett, supra note 362, at 71. Such areas, however, are few, but would, in this
author’s view, include the civil commitment of an individual based solely on future
dangerousness, without any additional special factor such as mental illness that helps
create the danger and that is beyond that individual’s control. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is unthinkable that the Executive
could render otherwise criminal grounds for detention noncriminal merely by
disclaiming an intent to prosecute, or by asserting that it was incapacitating
dangerous offenders rather than punishing wrongdoing.”). In accepting the expanded
use of civil commitment against mentally ill individuals, including violent sex
offenders (who are treated as suffering from a mental illness beyond their ability to
control), the Court has traded rigorous application of substantive due process
prohibiting preventive detention for greater procedural due process, such as a
heightened standard of proof. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 353 (1997)
(noting the heavy burden imposed on the state, along with other procedural
safeguards, at the civil commitment hearing); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
361
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and assess the legality of a deprivation of liberty—that is, can the
government restrict liberty under the particular circumstances
and, if so, what process must be provided when it does so.365
Habeas, by contrast, provides judicial review of the legality of
the liberty deprivation, an assessment that may include but is not
limited to whether it comports with substantive and procedural
due process.366 This review may also encompass, for example,
whether a liberty deprivation is authorized by statute, complies
with the statute’s requirements, and is authorized by the
Constitution. In some circumstances, habeas may itself supply the
vehicle for testing the legality of a physical restraint in the first
instance, such as where no administrative process has been
provided,367 some prior process has been provided but its
inadequacies prevent a reviewing court from engaging in
meaningful review of the detention’s legality,368 or where Congress
has specified that the habeas proceeding should itself provide the
forum for evaluating the detention in the first instance.369 But
whether a court is reviewing a prior determination or reviewing a
detention in the first instance, habeas’s overarching purpose is to
empower a judge to determine if the physical restraint is lawful.
Habeas, in short, is concerned not only with the liberty of the
prisoner, but also with unlawful action by the jailor.370

678, 690–91 (2001) (“[W]e have upheld preventive detention based on dangerousness
only when limited to specially dangerous individuals and subject to strong procedural
protections.”).
365
Garrett, supra note 362, at 57, 71.
366
Id.
367
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538 (holding that, in the absence of an underlying
administrative process, a habeas court reviewing the Executive’s detention of an
alleged enemy combatant can directly implement and enforce the constitutional
requirements of due process through habeas).
368
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 783–84 (2008) (finding that the significant
flaws of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT), coupled with the narrow
review of the tribunal’s determination in the court of appeals under the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), precludes a habeas court from conducting a meaningful
review of the legality of the detentions at Guantanamo). Notably, the Court observed
that even if the CSRT had satisfied due process standards, the risk of error remained
too significant and a court must, at minimum, have authority to examine exculpatory
evidence not introduced at the CSRT proceeding, which the DTA precluded the court
of appeals from doing. See id. at 785–92.
369
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226a(a)(6), (b)(1) (authorizing review under the federal habeas
statute of the indefinite detention of noncitizens ordered removed from the United
States but whose removal is not reasonably foreseeable and whose release “will
threaten the national security of the United States or the safety of the community or
any person”).
370
See, HALLIDAY, supra note 76, at 14.
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As noted above, the Due Process Clause can itself require
judicial review, depending on the nature and severity of the liberty
deprivation,371 and thus could provide an independent basis for
judicial review of immigration removal decisions. Yet, the habeas
review guaranteed by the Suspension Clause should secure
judicial review in the realm of detentions even without resort to
the Due Process Clause. Notably, in Boumediene, the Court
invalidated a federal statute eliminating habeas review over
Guantanamo detentions under the Suspension Clause without
deciding whether the Due Process Clause applied to the detainees
there.372 Absent a valid suspension of the writ by Congress, the
Court explained, habeas independently “entitles [a] prisoner to a
meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held
pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of
relevant law.”373 Lower courts, moreover, have since adjudicated
hundreds of Guantanamo detainee habeas petitions under
Boumediene to determine whether the petitioners are lawfully
detained, without ever determining whether the Due Process
Clause applies.374 This review illustrates a critical constitutional
function of habeas, and one that ultimately distinguishes it from
due process: whereas both habeas and due process protect the
liberty interests of the individuals, habeas additionally protects

371

See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692 (2001) (“[T]he Constitution may
well preclude granting ‘an administrative body the unreviewable authority to make
determinations implicating fundamental rights.’ ”) (quoting Superintendent, Mass.
Correctional Institution at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 450 (1985)); Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932) (“[U]nder certain circumstances, the constitutional
requirement of due process is a requirement of judicial process.”) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
372
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 792; see also Geltzer, supra note 361, at 725–26
(noting the Court’s decision in Boumediene was limited to the application of the
Suspension Clause to detentions at Guantanamo and left open the application of the
Due Process Clause to those detentions); cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567
(2006) (reviewing a habeas challenge to the legality of military commissions
established by the president and enforcing separation of powers principles without
ruling that the detainee benefitted from due process or other individual rights
guarantees under the Constitution).
373
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302
(2001)).
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See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 216, at 1466 (analyzing post-Boumediene habeas
decisions by federal district and appeals courts). The application of the Due Process
Clause at Guantanamo is presently before the full D.C. Circuit in Al-Hela v. Biden.
See Adam Chan, Al-Hela v. Biden and Due Process at Guantanamo, LAWFARE (May
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structural interests by ensuring the judiciary’s role in preventing
arbitrary and unlawful action by the executive.375
In sum, the Suspension Clause, with its long and venerated
tradition and explicit mandate in the Constitution’s text, has
proven the most durable and important backstop in litigation over
the government’s assertion of unreviewable power to detain and
remove noncitizens, as Boumediene and St. Cyr demonstrate.376
These cases, and Boumediene in particular, also underscore how
the Suspension Clause protects similar structural interests as
Article III by preserving the role of the judiciary in the separation
of powers.377 Thus, despite the potential availability of other
constitutional avenues for judicial review, experience and
centuries of Anglo-American legal tradition and history suggest
the value of continuing to focus on the Suspension Clause and its
protection of the habeas writ. Thuraissigiam—whose critical
errors have the potential to preclude judicial review over
immigration removal and potentially other physical restraints on
liberty—underscores the importance of developing a framework
that helps ensure the Suspension Clause remains a meaningful
guarantee of judicial review in the realm of detentions.
CONCLUSION
Even though Thuraissigiam addressed only detention in a
highly particularized context, its analysis could mark a sharp—
and unwarranted—turn in the Supreme Court’s Suspension
Clause jurisprudence. By suggesting the Suspension Clause
might protect against only one type of government restraint—that
of continued detention where a prisoner seeks mere release—the
Court cast uncertainty over the Suspension Clause’s application
not only to immigration removal but also to other forms of
detention. While continued imprisonment for criminal activity
375

See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Jurisdiction-Stripping in a Time of Terror,
95 CAL. L. REV. 1193, 1200–01 (2007) (explaining why the Suspension Clause “should
be conceptualized not as a matter of what rights the Constitution confers on the
detainees, but what constraints the Constitution imposes on the government,
wherever it operates”).
376
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 743–45 (describing the “essential” role that the
Suspension Clause plays in ensuring judicial review of restraints on liberty under the
Constitution); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301–02 (2001) (describing the historical
use of habeas corpus to remedy unlawful detention); see also Neuman, supra note 87,
at 1029, 1031 (describing why the Suspension Clause remains an indispensable
guarantee of judicial review of executive detention despite other potential avenues for
asserting a right to such review).
377
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 804.
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may be the quintessential liberty deprivation, it is far from the
only one, and habeas has been defined over time by its protean
nature rather than the type of rigid, circumscribed, and ultimately
ahistorical approach embraced by the Thuraissigiam majority.
The Supreme Court has long emphasized the importance of
the writ’s history in interpreting its availability and application.378
The Court’s decision in St. Cyr arguably incentivized even greater
reliance on the historical record in adjudicating a Suspension
Clause challenge since the Court emphasized there how the
historical record demonstrated that the particular immigration
order would have been reviewable through habeas in 1789, thus
falling within what the Court termed the irreducible
constitutional minimum.
And while Boumediene did not
ultimately conclude that the Suspension Clause applied at
Guantanamo based on the historical record from the Founding era,
it spent considerable time assessing it. Thuraissigiam, however,
creates a paradox: it underscores the importance of the writ’s
history by interpreting the Suspension Clause as protecting the
writ that existed in 1789; but it also undermines that history by
suggesting (wrongly) that only one type of historical evidence
counts in the assessment—that which shows the writ was used at
the Founding to challenge the same liberty deprivation it is being
used to challenge today. Such precision is something that history
often cannot and should not be expected to provide. It also
fundamentally misunderstands history itself: for, as the Framers
certainly understood, the writ that existed in 1789 and that was
constitutionalized in the Suspension Clause was never static but
rather dynamic and evolving, both capable of and intended to
reach new forms of detention to provide a judicial check on
arbitrary action by the Executive.
Even as Thuraissigiam poses significant obstacles for future
Suspension Clause challenges, it may also contain a silver lining
by channeling energy away from searches through the historical
record to find a one-to-one match with the precise issue presented
today. Indeed, by leaving open the possibility that the Suspension
Clause protects a writ that can and should evolve to reach types of
detention that did not exist in 1789, Thuraissigiam suggests the
need for renewed focus on this approach. History remains
important, as it helps illuminate the background understandings
378
See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 404, 410–11 (1963) (recounting the writ’s
history and its prior discussion by the Court), overruled by Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722 (1991).
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that animated the Suspension Clause and past usages of the
habeas writ. But greater emphasis should be placed on how the
Suspension Clause protects an evolving habeas writ, an inquiry
informed by the writ’s dual purpose in protecting liberty and
operating as a structural check on the executive, its changing use
over time, and the gravity of the liberty deprivation at stake. This
shift could give rise to the kind of Suspension Clause
jurisprudence promised in Boumediene—a jurisprudence more
consistent with how courts would have evaluated a novel use of
habeas in 1789. Such a jurisprudence would reason from the writ’s
broader purposes and would more closely align with how courts
treat related constitutional safeguards today, where tradition is
neither narrowly defined nor the exclusive criterion in
determining the constitutional provision’s meaning and scope.

